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ABSTRACT
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
asks courts to determine whether Congress has delegated to
administrative agencies the authority to resolve questions about the
meaning of statutes that those agencies implement, but the decision
does not give courts the tools for providing a proper answer. Chevron
directs courts to construe statutory text by applying the traditional
theories of statutory interpretation—whether intentionalism,
purposivism, or textualism—and to infer a delegation of agency
interpretive authority only if they fail to find a relatively specific
meaning. But the traditional theories, despite their differences, all
invite courts to construe statutory text as if Congress intended that text
to have a relatively specific meaning. The presumption of a specific
meaning does not match the reality of how Congress designs
regulatory statutes. Congress is more likely to eschew specificity in
favor of agency delegation under certain circumstances—for example,
if an issue is complex and if legislators can monitor subsequent
agency interpretations through administrative procedures. Although
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Chevron recognizes such “delegating” factors, it fails to sufficiently
credit them. Even United States v. Mead Corp., which makes
delegation the key question, falls short. This Article imagines what
interpretive theory would look like for regulatory statutes if it actually
incorporated realistic assumptions about legislative behavior. The
theory would engage factors such as the complexity of the issue and
the existence of administrative procedures as indications of
interpretive delegation more satisfactorily than existing law does. In
the process, it would produce a better role for courts in overseeing the
delegation of authority to agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies are
different from the rest. Congress may delegate to an agency not only
the authority to implement the statute but, implicitly, the authority to
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interpret it as well—that is, to specify its meaning. For other statutes,
courts resolve any interpretive questions. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
1
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. recognizes this essential
difference between regulatory statutes and other statutes. Chevron
asks courts to approach regulatory statutes by determining whether
Congress has delegated to the agency involved the relevant
interpretive authority. This Article argues, however, that the decision
fails to supply courts with the tools for providing a proper answer.
Chevron directs courts to determine “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” applying the
2
“traditional tools of statutory construction.” Only when courts find
no “clear” meaning for the statutory text do they infer a delegation of
interpretive authority to the agency. In applying Chevron, courts rely
heavily on the dominant theories of statutory interpretation:
intentionalism, purposivism, or textualism. Those theories, despite
their differences, all invite courts to construct a meaning for statutory
text as if Congress intended the text to carry a relatively specific
meaning. For example, intentionalism sees Congress as intending a
3
meaning, albeit expressing it imperfectly in the chosen text.
Purposivism understands Congress as motivated by a general aim in
4
enacting statutes, often imperfectly expressing that aim. Both permit
courts to consult legislative history in pursuit of legislative intent or

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See id. at 842, 843 n.9.
3. E.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20,
24 (1988) (“[Intentionalists] would scrutinize the legislative materials to see if the legislature
actually considered and expressed an opinion on the question under review.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429 (1989) (“[For intentbased views,] the goal is not to look at a general legislative aim or purpose, but instead to see
more particularly how the enacting legislature would have resolved the question, or how it
intended that question to be resolved, if it had been presented.”). The exception is a more
“objective” version of this theory. See, e.g., Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel
B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2131,
2137–38, 2143–46 (2005) (focusing interpretation on the objective intentionality that words
reflect).
4. E.g., Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative
Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 815
(1994) (“[P]urposivism calls on judges to identify the statute’s broader purposes and to resolve
the interpretive question in light of those purposes.”); see also, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 166–67, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1958) (focusing
interpretation on the broader purposes embodied in statutes and asking courts to assume,
“unless the contrary unmistakably appears,” that “the legislature was made up of reasonable
persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”).
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purpose. Meanwhile, textualism denies that legislative history is a
permissible interpretive source as this theory has a strikingly different
view of legislative behavior. Textualism tends to conform to public
choice theory and the claim that Congress has no intent or purpose
5
distinct from those explicitly stated in the statutory text.
Nevertheless, modern textualism invites courts to discern a meaning
for awkward or imprecise language. It sees the statutory meaning as
the likely product of strategic legislative compromise, which courts
should not unsettle through resort to legislative history. Textualists
also have a constitutional objection to the use of legislative history
6
because Congress only enacted the text.
The search for meaning, common to the dominant theories of
statutory interpretation, does not square with what a good deal of
positive political theory and legal scholarship has stated about
regulatory statutes. Congress often designs these statutes with the aim
7
of delegating authority, including interpretive authority, to agencies.

5. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads of legislators
and you find a hodgepodge.” (emphasis omitted)); John F. Manning, Continuity and the
Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1863, 1864 (2004) (“[M]odern formalists (qua
textualists) doubt that intent or purpose gleaned from the legislative history offers a reliable
way to resolve statutory indefiniteness.”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 684–89 (1997) [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine]
(describing textualist arguments against “genuine legislative intent”). See generally Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 453–57
(1988) (describing public choice insight behind textualism); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a
“They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992)
(“Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory expression.”). On textualism
generally, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1989); John
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390, 2408–19 (2002). For a
contrast between textualism and intentionalism, see John F. Manning, Textualism and
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005) [hereinafter Manning, Legislative Intent]. For a
contrast between textualism and purposivism, see Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997
Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Dialogue, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14–26 (1997); John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
6. E.g., Eskridge, supra note 5, at 646–50 (reviewing traditional textualist arguments that
the use of legislative history distorts the separation of powers between Congress and the
judiciary); see also, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 66 (“[The] text prevails over intent
because only the text went through the constitutional process.”); Farber & Frickey, supra note
5, at 454–56 (describing Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook’s constitutional objection that
using legislative history circumvents the constitutional lawmaking process); Manning,
Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 711–19 (arguing that the use of legislative history cedes
constitutional lawmaking authority from Congress as a whole to individual committees or
members of Congress).
7. See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950 (1998)
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Furthermore, Congress likely delegates authority to agencies under
certain circumstances. For example, it likely delegates to avoid
complex issues, which conserves legislative resources and capitalizes
8
on agency expertise. It also likely delegates to avoid contentious
9
issues and obtain consensus on legislation. Whatever the reason,
Congress seeks to ensure that subsequent agency action will not
depart too far from legislative preferences. It can do so through the
structure of regulatory statutes, imposing procedural requirements
that enable future legislative coalitions to monitor agency action by
10
placing constituents in the administrative process. It can consider
positions that the agency has steadfastly maintained in the past or
11
that the agency has offered in the course of legislative drafting.
Congress does not always delegate expressly but often leaves
12
interpretive questions for agencies to resolve.
Chevron recognizes such “delegating” factors; its mistake is
failing to make those factors central to its doctrinal inquiry. The
factors operate only as justifications for agency delegation, not as
guides for determining the existence of that delegation. Thus,
Chevron acknowledges that Congress may implicitly delegate
interpretive authority to agencies and may do so to capitalize on
13
agency expertise or to obtain legislative consensus. But rather than

(“[L]egislators will delegate in those issue areas where the normal legislative process is the least
efficient relative to regulatory policymaking by executive agencies.”).
8. See id. at 967.
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38
(1994) (asserting that legislators “create rather than avoid ambiguity” when necessary to avoid
making choices that are unpopular with their constituents); Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C.
Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory
Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641 (2002) (“[It] is not unusual for competing
factions of Congress to ‘agree to disagree’ in the drafting of a statute.”); Victoria F. Nourse &
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 596 (2002) (interviewing legislative staffers who confirm that legislators use deliberate
ambiguity to obtain consensus); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom
and the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811–12 (1983) (identifying the failure to agree as a
cause of statutory ambiguity).
10. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246 (1987) [hereinafter
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures]; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry
R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process].
11. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 131–33 (1999).
12. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596–97.
13. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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implementing these insights as part of the doctrinal analysis, Chevron
reverts to the conventional theories of statutory interpretation in
14
search of a meaning. Agency delegation is an afterthought, if a
thought at all. The very search for a meaning directs courts away from
what many scholars have been saying about regulatory statutes—
15
namely, that Congress can consider others factors.
16
Nor does United States v. Mead Corp. correct the problem.
Mead recognizes that when Congress intends for an agency to issue
interpretations with the force of law, it authorizes certain
17
administrative procedures for that purpose. By focusing on
procedures rather than the statutory text, Mead makes delegation
rather than meaning the key question. Notwithstanding this
important insight, the decision does not provide the best way to judge
delegation. It requires that Congress authorize (and agencies utilize)
sufficiently formal procedures but does not connect those procedures
to their legislative function. Rather, Mead connects procedures to the
“force of law.” Procedures can be important to Congress because they
facilitate legislative monitoring and not necessarily because they
promote rule-of-law values. Courts interested in delegation should
ensure that procedures are adequate for their strategic legislative
function. And courts should regard sufficiently formal procedures as
affirmative indications of agency delegation. Under Mead, these
procedures merely enable courts to apply Chevron as usual.
This Article imagines what interpretive theory would look like
for regulatory statutes if courts were to truly gauge the existence of
agency delegation. In short, courts would look for evidence that
Congress has delegated the task of specifying the meaning of a statute
14. See id. at 842, 843 n.9; see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a
Voting Rule, 116 YALE. L.J. 676, 690–91 (2007) (noting that the traditional interpretive theories
ask courts to construct a best meaning for ambiguous statutory language); Grundfest &
Pritchard, supra note 9, at 628 (“[J]udges and scholars have developed an arsenal of interpretive
techniques that are designed to extract functional meaning from ambiguous statutory text and
conflicting legislative history.”); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 617 (“[T]o the extent that
intentionalism assumes a legislative intent always exists or that textualism assumes a deliberate
and precise legislative word choice, these theories may rely on questionable empirical
assumptions across the run of cases.” (emphasis omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 950 (arguing that legislators delegate
when the legislative process produces less efficient outcomes than the administrative process);
Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 640–42 (describing legislative incentives to delegate
authority); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596–97 (quoting legislative staffers discussing the
political-consensus-building purposes of delegation).
16. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
17. Id. at 231–33.
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to the agency charged with implementing it. Rather than focusing
heavily or exclusively on the relative clarity of statutory language,
courts would examine the sorts of considerations that positive
political theorists and legal scholars have identified as indications of
legislative intent to delegate interpretive issues to agencies. Assuming
Congress likely delegates for reasons related to the complexity or
contentiousness of the issue addressed by a statute, courts should
consider the complexity or contentiousness of the issue by examining
the statute or the surrounding context. Congress also likely delegates
under conditions that minimize principle-agent concerns. It can use
administrative procedures to monitor agency interpretations. Or it
can rely on a position that the agency has long maintained in the past
or offered in the course of legislative drafting. Courts should look for
signs of these factors as well, either in the statute or the surrounding
context. The stronger the case for interpretive delegation, the more
courts should hesitate to read the statutory text as “clear” on the
theory that Congress intended such clarity. Ordinarily, courts search
for a meaning to avoid undermining statutory purposes or unsettling
legislative deals. Under delegating assumptions, courts would show
genuine respect for Congress by not allowing the relative clarity of
the language to defeat what is most plausibly understood as an
interpretive delegation.
In this Article, I use two Supreme Court opinions to illustrate the
framework that I envision. In Zuni Public School District No. 89 v.
18
Department of Education, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
consciously set aside Chevron’s question of statutory meaning and
19
examined the political factors relevant to interpretive delegation. He
upheld the agency interpretation on the basis of these political
factors, drawing criticism from virtually every other Justice for his
unorthodox analysis, even those who agreed with his ultimate
20
21
disposition of the case. In Gonzales v. Oregon, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, found that the issue was not the sort that
22
Congress was likely to have delegated to the agency involved. He
made this determination based on realistic assumptions about

18. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007).
19. Id. at 1541.
20. See, e.g., id. at 1551 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (worrying because the “opinion of the
Court . . . inverts Chevron’s logical progression”).
21. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
22. Id. at 925.

BRESSMAN IN FINAL2.DOC

556

12/8/2008 2:25:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:549

legislative behavior, including the lack of reasons for and conditions
23
of interpretive delegation. Neither Justice explained precisely why
these unconventional analyses were appropriate. But both implicitly
recognized the need to depart from the norm.
I argue that this departure is justified because it conforms to
congressional will and for the other well-known reasons that Chevron
captures: agencies generally should elaborate regulatory policy
because they are more expert and politically accountable than
24
courts. At the same time, this approach does not call for abject
judicial deference or judicial abdication. For example, courts would
not allow agencies to assert interpretive authority when Congress has
not authorized proper procedures. In so doing, courts would serve as
“faithful agents” by enabling Congress to control when not to
delegate. By the same token, they would reinforce rule-of-law values
because procedural formality tends to ensure that agency action is
rational and fair. In addition to preserving delegation, courts would
still police its exercise. Thus, courts would ensure that agencies
remain within the scope of their delegated authority and issue
25
reasonable interpretations.
I acknowledge that widespread adoption of a “delegationrespecting” approach has downsides. Even if the Supreme Court is
capable of applying it with a reasonable degree of accuracy, lower
courts might face considerable difficulties. Mead has already
introduced confusion on the issue of legislative intent to delegate, and
26
that case is restricted to a single procedural consideration. A
delegation-respecting approach, which essentially articulates and
develops Mead’s basic insight, might make matters worse. Although
these concerns have merit, I believe that courts and commentators
should not condemn the approach based solely on lower courts’
experience with Mead. The Court has made applying that decision

23. See id. at 917–22 (considering the relevant expertise of the agency, the moral nature of
the question, and the procedures for issuing the interpretation).
24. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
25. Administrative law has long provided a basis for such review, for example, in the
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (elaborating the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking).
26. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446–81 (2005) (providing an empirical study of lower court cases);
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 passim
(2003) (showing confusion in D.C. Circuit cases trying to apply Mead).
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more complicated than it needs to be, and my theory offers significant
clarifications. If courts and commentators reject all other suggestions
from this Article, they should accept the suggestion to embrace and
reform Mead. Mead moves in the right direction by making agency
delegation rather than statutory meaning the threshold question.
Even restricted to a gatekeeper function, precluding delegations
rather than validating them, Mead advances legislative supremacy
and rule-of-law values. Refocusing on the legislative use of
procedures would provide courts with more guidance and impose
fewer institutional costs.
In the end, I acknowledge that no theory based on legislative
intent to delegate will yield a simple rule. Ultimately, simplicity is not
the sole benchmark for evaluating any interpretive theory. An
acceptable theory should reflect a reasonable balance among the
27
various goals of statutory interpretation. If courts and commentators
nevertheless reject a delegation-respecting theory on institutional
28
grounds, as Justice Scalia advocated in Mead, they should also reject
the search for meaning on other grounds. The overarching lesson
from this Article is that the search for meaning gives courts too much
power to frustrate interpretive delegations when Congress is likely to
intend them and when they are likely to promote other normative
values. Even if sufficiently simple from an institutional standpoint,
existing law cannot supply the relevant “rule” for normative reasons.
In its place, courts and commentators should be prepared to adopt a
presumption of judicial deference to agency interpretations—one
stronger than Chevron’s presumption ever has been.
Finally, I discuss the implications for the use of statutory
interpretation to constrain broad delegations. Ever since the demise
of the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, courts have relied on
statutory interpretation as a surrogate for addressing concerns about
29
broad delegations. Agencies can use broad delegations to produce

27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2044
(2006) (book review) (arguing against an institutionally simple interpretive proposal that
generates normative costs).
28. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. The nondelegation doctrine reflects constitutional limits on Congress’s ability to
delegate regulatory authority to agencies. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403–06
(2000) [hereinafter Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium] (encapsulating the history of
the nondelegation doctrine). With the exception of two 1935 decisions, the Court has never
applied the doctrine to ban a statutory delegation. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
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undemocratic policies, impair states’ rights, raise constitutional
questions, and impose harsh criminal penalties. On one view,
Chevron and Mead are not wrong and are framed to allow courts to
address these concerns. My argument suggests this view can no longer
be premised on congressional will, as it sometimes is. Congress is
likely to intend the very delegations that courts (and commentators)
aim to restrict. Still, a delegation-respecting theory does not preclude
courts from using statutory interpretation to address delegation
worries if they justify that practice on other grounds. There is a better
way. Analytically, it makes more sense to address nondelegation
worries through administrative law rather than statutory
interpretation. Specifically, I argue that courts should remand agency
interpretations rather than narrowing regulatory statutes. This role
allows courts to express their views without overstepping their
bounds. In addition, it affords agencies an opportunity to craft better
policy by applying their specialized expertise and consulting with the
political branches.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that the
conventional theories of statutory interpretation share a basic search
for meaning, which administrative law doctrine does not sufficiently
alter. Yet the search for meaning is inappropriate because it does not
match how Congress designs regulatory statutes. Part II sketches an
interpretive theory that better matches legislative realities, departing
in significant respect from existing doctrine. Part III offers two
Supreme Court opinions as examples of how the theory might work
in actual practice. Part IV considers institutional and normative
objections to the theory and offers some responses.

States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (invalidating a statute under nondelegation doctrine); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (same). It has merely insisted that Congress
supply an “intelligible principle” in the statute guiding the agency’s exercise of delegated
authority. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (articulating
the intelligible principle requirement for the first time). Finding this requirement easily satisfied,
the Court has relied on statutory interpretation to vindicate its abiding worries about broad
delegations. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 515–52 (2008) (describing constitutional law
and administrative law as efforts to combat worries about arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking that stem from broad delegations). More specifically, it has used various
interpretive norms to narrowly construed broad statutory delegations. See Bressman, Schechter
Poultry at the Millennium, supra, at 1408–15 (describing the use of interpretive norms to
constrain broad delegations); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110–15 (1990) (discussing the emergence of clear statement principles as
a surrogate for the nondelegation doctrine).
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I. THE DOMINANT THEORIES AND THEIR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE
Although the dominant theories of statutory interpretation differ
in many ways, they share an important feature: they invite courts to
construe statutory text as if Congress intended that text to have a
relatively specific meaning. That presumption does not reflect how
Congress designs regulatory statutes, as administrative law doctrine
recognizes. In this Part, I show that existing doctrine, in particular
Chevron and Mead, nonetheless allows this presumption to dominate
and therefore allows courts to deprive agencies of interpretive
authority more often than Congress intends. To demonstrate the full
extent of the problem, I set forth the core aspects of regulatory
statutes that positive political theorists and legal scholars have
identified.
A. The Search for Statutory Meaning
The conventional theories of statutory interpretation take
varying approaches to awkward or imprecise text in part because they
hold different pictures about legislative behavior. Intentionalists and
purposivists see legislative inadvertence or, more specifically, the
inevitable difficulty of capturing all the aspects or applications of a
30
policy in a relatively few words. According to these theorists,
Congress has a meaning or a purpose in mind but sometimes chooses
words that poorly or incompletely express it. Intentionalists seek to
recover the meaning when interpreting words, using legislative
history when relevant, and purposivists look for indications of
31
broader statutory purposes. Modern proponents of these theories

30. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 23 (“Intentionalism . . . claims that textualism
inappropriately ignores contextual elements in statutory interpretation. Contextual analysis is
necessary as a matter of semantics (words have no ‘plain meaning’; meaning depends on context
and usage).”); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 416 (“The central problem is that the meaning of words
(whether ‘plain’ or not) depends on both culture and context. Statutory terms are not selfdefining, and words have no meaning before or without interpretation.”); see also John F.
Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009,
2013–16 (2006) (describing the interpretive approaches of many thinkers, including Justice
Stevens and Judge Posner, as reflecting this view of the legislative process).
31. See, e.g., Redish & Chung, supra note 4, at 816 (“[Purposivists] would also have their
judges explore the entire legal landscape to determine how the statute at hand can best be made
to fit within its greater legal context.”); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 430 (arguing that
intentionalism can provide useful “context and purpose”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY 85 (1994) (describing purposivism as an approach under which “judges should pay
primary attention to a statute’s purpose”); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74
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look for more objective evidence on the assumption that actual
legislative intent may be hard to reconstruct given the complexities of
the legislative process; but they assume that every enacted law has a
32
reasonable purpose or an “intentionalist stance.”
By contrast, modern textualists trace awkward or imprecise text
33
to legislative compromise. They view the legislative process as
chaotic and messy. In this environment, legislators cut deals to obtain
34
consensus, and awkward words reflect those deals. Modern
textualists adhere to the ordinary meaning of those words to give
35
effect to whatever deal they may manifest. Textualists also maintain
a rule-of-law or constitutional defense against the use of legislative
36
history because only the text is enacted.
On the basis of their respective visions, proponents of each
theory ask courts to announce the statutory meaning that best reflects
what Congress was after—for example, a broad statutory purpose or
a specific legislative deal. By construing language in this fashion,
those proponents all can claim to position courts as faithful agents of
Congress. Undoubtedly, the different camps believe that their theory
will produce a statutory meaning that most often reflects the
legislative design.
The basic law governing interpretation of regulatory statutes
reflects a different picture of legislative behavior. Chevron establishes
a two-step test for courts to apply when reviewing agency
interpretations of regulatory statutes. The Chevron test tells courts
first to determine whether “Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,” applying the “traditional tools of statutory

FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (2006) (“Purposivists, or intentionalists, look at . . . legislative
history and other background social understandings[]in an effort to figure out what Congress
was up to.”).
32. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1124 (“Every statute must be conclusively
presumed to be a purposive act.”).
33. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
34. See Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 5, at 441 (“[Textualists] believe that
smoothing over the rough edges in a statute threatens to upset whatever complicated bargaining
led to its being cast in the terms that it was.”).
35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
36. See Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 695–705 (arguing that the
legislative history bypasses the Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment); John
F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 71–74 (2001)
(arguing that Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment compel textualism).
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construction. But when courts find no meaning for the statutory text,
Chevron instructs them to defer to the agency interpretation as long
38
as that interpretation is reasonable. Chevron recognizes that
Congress may intend for agencies rather than courts to fill gaps in
39
regulatory statutes. It notes that Congress may have a variety of
reasons for delegating interpretive authority to agencies—for
example, to capitalize on agency expertise or to obtain legislative
40
consensus. Regardless of the particular reason, Chevron directs
courts to accept the legislative assignment of interpretive authority
41
and defer to reasonable agency interpretations. Doing so is
consistent not only with congressional delegation but also with
administrative expertise and political accountability. Agencies possess
more expertise than courts for handling regulatory schemes that are
“technical and complex” and for reconciling the “competing
42
interests” that regulatory decisions often involve. Agencies are also
accountable to the people, not directly but through the president, and
“it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of Government to
43
make such policy choices.”
Mead recognizes that whether Congress intends an agency to
issue an interpretation with the force of law depends on whether
Congress has authorized and the agency has used certain procedures
for that purpose. Mead involved an interpretation that the United
States Customs Service had issued through a ruling letter addressed
44
to a party seeking guidance on a tariff classification. These letters
come from forty-six different offices of the agency at a rate of 10,000
to 15,000 per year without an opportunity for public participation and
45
are generally unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation. The Court
held that Congress would not intend to delegate interpretive
46
authority to an agency through such a procedure. In this way, Mead
suggests that Congress would not intend to delegate interpretive

37.
(1984).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9
Id. at 843–44.
Id. at 865.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
Id.
Id.
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authority to an agency absent the authorization (and use) of
sufficiently formal procedures, such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. Procedural formality ensures
“fairness and deliberation” and “bespeak[s] the legislative type of
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the
47
ruling.”
Although Chevron and Mead offer a view of legislative behavior
that is appropriately different from the standard view, neither directs
courts to adopt a sufficiently different (or better) method of statutory
interpretation. Chevron mentions the reasons for interpretive
delegation as a justification for judicial deference. But it actually
directs courts to approach awkward or imprecise statutory language
by asking the same question as the standard theories of statutory
interpretation: whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
48
question at issue.” And it tells courts to answer that question
49
applying the “traditional tools of statutory construction.” Thus,
courts effectively approach interpretive questions mindful of giving
effect to broad statutory purposes or finely tuned legislative deals.
Only when that effort reveals no clear meaning do courts infer a
50
delegation of interpretive authority. In other words, courts treat a
lack of clarity as the exclusive proxy for interpretive delegation.
Perhaps, then, it is no wonder that a wide range of legal scholars have
characterized the congressional delegation rationale for Chevron as a
51
fiction. Because Congress probably does not draft statutes with
Chevron in mind, courts can justify judicial deference, if at all, using
the other values that Chevron cites—agency expertise and political
52
accountability.

47. Id. at 230, 232.
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
49. Id. at 843 n.9.
50. Id. at 842.
51. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027, 2132 (2002) (“[E]ven adherents to [Chevron] theory . . . acknowledge that the
evidence of such enacting congressional intent is ‘weak’ and even ‘fictional’ . . . .”); Gersen &
Vermeule, supra note 14, at 689 (noting that Justices and commentators have recognized that
the presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron is a “fiction” and agreeing with this
view); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 871–72
(2001) (noting that the presumption of legislative intent underlying Chevron deference “has
been described by even [Chevron’s] strongest defender [Justice Scalia] as ‘fictional’”).
52. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. Many have expressed other views about Chevron,
including the view that it is premised on congressional allocation of interpretive authority
between agencies and courts. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 837; Kevin M. Stack, The
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Mead adds a procedural dimension to the analysis, making
legislative intent to delegate the threshold inquiry of statutory
interpretation. But the Mead opinion does not carry the procedural
consideration through to its proper conclusion. Mead deprives
agencies of interpretive authority when procedures are deficient
because the procedures lack the law-like features that Mead
emphasizes. Mead has essentially no effect, however, when the statute
authorizes and the agency uses relatively formal procedures—as when
an agency interpretation is the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Even if the agency passes the Mead analysis, courts
proceed to apply Chevron as usual, effectively regarding words as
poor expressions or concrete deals unless that approach fails to
produce a clear meaning. Because Mead gives way to Chevron in
routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter the standard search
for statutory meaning.
The result is that, Chevron and Mead notwithstanding, courts
approach regulatory statutes with much the same mindset as they
approach other statutes. It follows that they are just as likely to find a
specific meaning in a case involving an agency as in a case that does
not. This is not an empirical claim, although it well might be true.
Rather, it is an analytical claim about the framework that courts
apply. Because courts approach awkward or imprecise text in
regulatory statutes mindful of respecting broad statutory purposes or
particular legislative deals, they are unlikely to grant agencies their
delegated interpretive authority as often as Congress intends.
Chevron cannot overcome the problem by simply instructing
courts to set aside their meaning in favor of an agency’s “reasonable”
Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 587 (2005); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467,
472–74 (2002) (arguing that Congress once used a legislative convention to confer on agencies
the authority to act with the force of law and that, when this convention fell out of use, courts
adopted a deferential approach to determining whether Congress authorized an agency to act
with the force of law). Although the literature conceptualizing Chevron is too vast to cite, other
excellent examples include Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy
of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 29.
53. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (holding that congressional
intent to delegate the authority to make rules with the force of law “may be shown in a variety
of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking”).
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meaning. The thought is a good one, but it is easier said than done.
Once courts work actively to construct a meaning for statutory text,
as they do under all the dominant theories of statutory interpretation,
they will have considerable difficulty recognizing the reasonableness
of other interpretations. As Professor Thomas Merrill has observed
about textualism:
Textualism . . . seems to transform statutory interpretation into a
kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The textualist judge treats
questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it is assumed there
is one right answer. The task is to assemble the various pieces of
linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons into the best (most
coherent, most explanatory) account of the meaning of the
statute . . . .
This active, creative approach to interpretation is subtly
incompatible with an attitude of deference toward other
institutions—whether the other institution is Congress or an
administrative agency. In effect, the textualist interpreter does not
find the meaning of the statute so much as construct the meaning.
Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty in deferring
54
to the meanings that other institutions have developed.

Professor Merrill sees less risk of judicial ingenuity in
intentionalism because the judge remains more cognizant of
55
legislative intent and has more tools available for finding such intent.
In my view, intentionalism and purposivism are still vulnerable to
judicial craft because they also ask courts to construct a meaning for
statutory text on the assumption that the text has one right answer.
This way of thinking makes it difficult to see other possible meanings
and, moreover, to accept the assignment of interpretive authority to
the agency. Professors Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule have gone
even further to suggest that judges cannot set aside their meaning for
56
the agency’s meaning. Once a court has found that the text is
susceptible to a best reading, Professors Gersen and Vermeule
question what it means as a conceptual matter for the text to have

54. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 372 (1994).
55. See id.
56. See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 697–98.
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other “reasonable” readings. How can an incorrect interpretation
nevertheless be reasonable? They also question whether courts
psychologically can abandon the view to which they have become
58
committed. The authors quote Justice Breyer, who wrote,
It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with
the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both that the agency’s
interpretation is legally wrong, and that its interpretation is
reasonable. More often one concludes that there is a “better” view
of the statute for example, and that the “better” view is “correct,”
59
and the alternative view is “erroneous.”

Somewhat counterintuitive, the search for meaning is
problematic whether a court finds a meaning that precludes an agency
interpretation or permits it. Most worrisome is when a court finds a
meaning that precludes an agency interpretation because, under such
circumstances, the court is able to substitute its idea of wise policy for
that of the agency. As Chevron recognizes, courts should restrain
themselves in this regard because the agency is the congressional
delegate as well as the more technically sophisticated and politically
60
responsive policymaker. Yet the search for meaning is also
worrisome when a court finds a meaning that is consistent with an
agency interpretation. It is worrisome because an agency, though
victorious in the short term, may lack authority to alter its
interpretation as circumstances change. Chevron anticipates that
agency interpretations may evolve over time, whether as a result of
61
emerging technologies or new administrations. But the Court has
clarified in a subsequent decision that such interpretive room only
exists when the statutory text is ambiguous, not when a court has

57. See id. at 693–97 (discussing the conceptual problems that arise when attempting to
discern the limits of “reasonable” interpretation).
58. See id. at 697–98 (making use of Justice Scalia’s opinion in MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), to illustrate the tendency of courts to commit to one
“right” interpretation when other reasonable interpretations are available).
59. Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 697 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986)).
60. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“In these cases the Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.” (footnotes omitted)).
61. See id. at 863–64 (“[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider
varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).
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62

previously determined that it is clear. When a court finds that the
statutory text has a specific meaning, it forecloses future changes,
even if flexibility is part of why Congress created the agency in the
first instance.
To summarize, the conventional theories of statutory
interpretation invite courts to answer a question about statutory
meaning, and neither Chevron nor Mead sufficiently displaces that
inquiry. As a result, courts are likely to find a specific meaning for
statutory text more often than Congress intends. The remaining
Sections explain more fully why the search for meaning is
inappropriate for regulatory statutes. It does not match what many
positive political theorists and legal scholars have been saying about
how Congress designs regulatory statutes.
B. The Possibility of Agency Delegation
Political scientists have sought to explain why Congress delegates
63
authority to agencies. Although many strands of such work might be
useful in illustrating the set of factors that motivate Congress, I rely
here on positive political theory (PPT) because it offers hypotheses
about legislative behavior that are comparable to those on which the
dominant theories of statutory interpretation have tended to rely.
PPT thus provides a helpful platform from which to evaluate those
theories.
Positive political theorists start from the premise that Congress is
composed of members who, as rational actors, primarily seek to
64
improve their reelection chances. They may have other goals—“such
as the desire for power, rewarding friends, and good government”—
65
but they cannot achieve any of these goals unless they hold office.
To improve their reelection prospects, members of Congress seek
policies that track their preferences or, more specifically, the

62. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005) (holding that an agency interpretation may overrule a prior judicial interpretation only if
the underlying statutory language is ambiguous).
63. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, ECONOMICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ECONOMICS
OF LAW vi–xvii (2007) (summarizing the literature).
64. See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 961 (“We assume the preferences of
legislators and the President to be, first and foremost, reelection.”).
65. Id.
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preferences of their constituents. One way to ensure that policy
tracks legislative preferences is for Congress to specify that policy—
67
that is, to write “detailed, exacting laws.” But this approach is not
always best. In certain circumstances, Congress may determine that
delegation to agencies is actually the better way to serve its interests.
Consider first and foremost that Congress has limits on its time
68
and expertise. Every resource devoted to specifying policy is a
resource unavailable for other “electorally productive activities,”
69
including campaign activities. When Congress enlists the aid of
agencies to set regulatory policy, it might do so because it lacks the
requisite time and expertise to formulate the details of such policy. As
Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran explain, the reasons
are twofold:
The first and most obvious reason is that the executive branch is
filled (or can be filled) with policy experts who can run tests and
experiments, gather data, and otherwise determine the wisest course
of policy, much more so than can 535 members of Congress and
their staff. The second, less obvious reason has to do with the fact
that expertise garnered in legislative committees cannot be
transformed directly into policy outcomes. Rather, it must first pass
through the floor, which may decide to make some alterations to the
committee’s proposals. The existence of the floor as a policy middleman gives committees less incentive to gather information in the
first place. Executive agencies, on the other hand, are not hampered
by the need to obtain congressional approval; their rulings become
70
law directly.

66. Id. (“We assume that political actors who seek reelection will, on any given policy,
attempt to bring final outcomes as close as possible to the median voter in their politically
relevant constituency.”).
67. Id. at 962; see also David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures,
Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994) (noting that a direct
method of circumscribing agency influence is “explicitly limiting the discretion of an agency to
move outcomes from the status quo”); Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side
of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 213, 228 (1990) (“The most direct way is for
today’s authorities to specify, in excruciating detail, precisely what the agency is to do and how
it is to do it, leaving as little as possible to the discretionary judgment of bureaucrats . . . .”).
68. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 701; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 106–12 (2000); B. Dan Wood &
John Bohte, Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design, 66 J. POL. 176,
176 (2004).
69. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 962.
70. Id. at 967 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, Congress cannot gain expertise as efficiently as agencies, and it
cannot transform its expertise into policy solutions as easily as
agencies. The costs of writing specific legislation are high, indeed
wastefully so. Congress therefore is likely to delegate more authority
71
to agencies “[t]he more complex [the] policy area” is.
Consider next that Congress balances a variety of other interests
in deciding how much authority to delegate to agencies. For example,
Congress might attempt to avoid blame for controversial policy
choices by shifting them to agencies, while still claiming credit for
72
broad solutions to public problems. In other words, Congress might
aim to write just enough policy to receive a positive response for its
actions, while deflecting any negative attention for the burdensome
details to the agency. Legislators also might consider whether to
allocate interpretive authority to courts or agencies by assessing the
relative risk that each institution will depart from legislative
preferences. For example, a legislator who holds views consistent with
the preferences of the median legislator might prefer judicial
interpretation, whereas a legislator who holds views different from
the median legislator might prefer agency interpretation. The
hypothesis is that courts are more likely to issue decisions that track
the preferences of the median legislator, and agencies may diverge in
73
other directions. Legislators may base this choice on a particular
distinction. Judicial decisions are more predictable over time but
74
more variable across issues than agency decisions. Congress’s

71. Id.
72. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9–12, 49–57 (1993); see also JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 235–256 (1989)
(exploring how Congress exerts control over regulatory agencies through delegation and the
legislative process); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 55–63 (1982) (dissecting and comparing several
hypotheses that try to explain why Congress delegates power to agencies); Morris P. Fiorina,
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB.
CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982) (examining claims that Congress delegates power to regulatory
agencies to shift both decisionmaking and political costs to the agency).
73. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of
Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 44–55 (1986) (arguing that model legislators choose
between two lotteries: one involving courts, whose decisions are expected to reflect the
preferences of the median legislator, and one involving agencies, whose decisions are expected
to be biased away from the intent of that legislator).
74. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038, 1047–49
(2006).
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allocation of interpretive authority in a particular instance depends
on whether the median legislator prefers policy stability (courts) or
75
coherence (agencies).
Another dimension is also relevant: political alignment between
76
the legislative branch and the executive branch. Professors Epstein
and O’Halloran have argued, for example, that Congress is likely to
delegate more authority to executive branch agencies when the
president is of the same political party, that is, during periods of
77
unified government. In such periods, Congress may reasonably
assume that presidential preferences are less likely to diverge from
78
legislative preferences. By the same token, Congress is likely to
delegate to independent agencies, which are run by officials who are
protected by statute from plenary presidential removal, if it desires
79
delegation but the president is from the opposite political party.
These observations connect to a broader point: whatever the
motivation for delegating to agencies, positive political theorists agree
that Congress remains aware that agencies may choose policies that
80
depart from legislative preferences. Put simply, delegation creates a
81
principal-agent problem. Agencies are influenced from a number of
directions—“by the President, by interest groups, by the courts, and
by the bureaucrats themselves”—and those pressures may push
82
regulatory policies away from legislative preferences. Congress

75. See id. at 1049–58.
76. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 131–33.
77. See id.
78. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 966.
79. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 11, at 154–55.
80. See generally Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational
Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 501–04 (1989) (describing
bureaucratic drift, which is the difference between policy passed in legislation and policy
implemented by an agency, and coalitional drift, during which legislative and executive
preferences change over time); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and
Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 113–16 (1992) (same).
81. See JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 26 (2002) (“The principalagent framework from economics has played an extremely prominent and powerful role in [the]
institutional approach to relations between politicians and bureaucrats.”).
82. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT
GOVERN? 267, 271 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (“Experts have their own
interests—in career, in autonomy—that may conflict with those of [legislators].”); Epstein &
O’Halloran, supra note 7, at 963.
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therefore seeks to monitor agency action, but it must devise
mechanisms for acquiring information about that action.
Professors Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have
identified two sorts of monitoring mechanisms: “police patrols” and
83
“fire alarms.” Police patrols are committee hearings and other direct
84
forms of oversight. Fire alarms are indirect forms of oversight; they
85
enlist private parties to gather information about agency action.
Professors McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (McNollgast)
have argued that Congress can use the procedures in the
86
Administrative Procedure Act as fire alarms. More specifically,
Congress can use administrative procedures to place constituents into
the administrative process, where they may acquire the information
87
necessary to evaluate agency action. If displeased with that action,
they may alert members of Congress to intervene before the agency
88
has altered the status quo. McNollgast also contend that Congress
can use procedures to “stack the deck” in favor of the same
constituents that supported a regulatory statute by affording those
89
constituents access to agency decisions before they are final.
Administrative procedures are particularly efficient and effective
monitoring mechanisms, shifting the monitoring costs from Congress
90
to its constituents.
For Congress, ex post oversight mechanisms, including
91
administrative procedures, form a “precondition” of delegation and
92
also “make the benefits of statutory control less compelling.” Thus,
ex post oversight mechanisms and statutory control (through specific

83. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
84. Id. at 166.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 173–74.
87. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 10, at 248; McCubbins et
al., Structure and Process, supra note 10, at 442; see also Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Pablo T.
Spiller & Santiago Urbiztondo, An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 238, 301 (1999) (modeling the functions of administrative procedures).
88. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 10, at 442.
89. Id. at 442, 444 (italics omitted).
90. See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 10, at 254 (“[B]ecause
policy is controlled by participants in administrative processes, political officials can use
procedures to control policy without bearing costs themselves . . . .”).
91. Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 716 (emphasis omitted).
92. Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints,
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 101 (1997).
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wording) can act as “substitutes” for one another. The presence of
one can suggest less need for the other.
All of these observations furnish assumptions about the
considerations that matter to Congress in allocating regulatory
authority. None is without criticisms. The important point is that
positive political theorists are in basic agreement that Congress is
strategic in how it designs regulatory statutes, and that such strategic
behavior is relevant in examining regulatory statutes.
C. The Possibility of Deliberate Ambiguity
Another phenomenon is also relevant. Both PPT scholars and
legal scholars have observed that a divided Congress may choose
deliberately ambiguous words to obtain consensus, thereby delegating
94
interpretive authority to agencies or courts. Thus, Congress can use
awkward words to achieve legislative compromise, as textualists
95
assert. But the compromises are more like dodges than deals.
Congress chooses words that are imprecise enough for legislators with
opposing views each to claim victory. Meanwhile, the language also
allows those legislators to press for their favored positions at the later
96
administrative or judicial level. The ultimate losers may avoid blame
by laying it at the feet of the responsible agency or court. By choosing
97
words that “mean all things to all people,” Congress can obtain the

93. Id.
94. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that the simple “plain meaning” rule of
textualism overlooks that “the goals of at least some of the authors are to create rather than
avoid ambiguity”); Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 641 (“[I]t is not unusual for
competing factions of Congress to ‘agree to disagree’ in the drafting of a statute.”); Mathew D.
McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 742–43
(1985) (asserting that legislators delegate when necessary to obtain consensus on policy);
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596 (interviewing legislative staffers who confirm the use of
deliberate ambiguity to obtain consensus); Posner, supra note 9, at 806–07 (identifying failure to
agree as a cause of statutory ambiguity).
95. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 641 (“Each constituency can hope that its
position will ultimately prevail, and ambiguity thereby expands the circle of winners in
legislative battles, at least temporarily.”); Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative
Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y 287, 290 (1989) (“A problem may be defined in general
terms . . . because it is easier to secure support for ambiguously worded statutes that mean all
things to all people.”).
96. See Katzmann, supra note 95, at 290–91 (“Once a problem is identified or recognized,
interests within and without Congress push for an interpretation consistent with their policy
preferences, regardless of whether it is faithful to the original legislative intent.”).
97. Id. at 290.
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requisite support to enact a bill while preserving opportunities to
recommence the battle at another time and in another place.
Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter have identified the
phenomenon of deliberate ambiguity empirically by interviewing
98
legislative staffers. According to Professors Nourse and Schacter, the
staffers recognized that a decision to create ambiguity left future
99
resolution to courts and agencies. Nevertheless, the staffers stated
that unless legislators can get a bill passed, they can do nothing at
100
all. But for some, the delegation was as intentional as the ambiguity.
Staffers “realized that statutory ambiguity created an opportunity to
let an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve the issue, and sometimes
101
they specifically desired this result as well.”
Professors Joseph Grundfest and Adam Pritchard have identified
an example of this phenomenon in the Private Securities Litigation
102
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). I set out this example in some detail
103
because I refer to it later. The PSLRA arose under circumstances
suggesting that Congress could not have enacted the statute without
agreeing to disagree about the applicable pleading standard for
104
liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Before the PSLRA, the Supreme Court had held that mere
105
negligence did not satisfy the scienter requirement. Lower courts
that addressed the issue diverged on whether a “barely reckless” or
106
“highly reckless” standard applied. Furthermore, the lower courts
divided on the actual pleading requirements: whether plaintiffs must
“allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent,”
107
as the Second Circuit determined, or could get away with merely

98. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 596 (interviewing sixteen staffers working on
the Senate Judiciary Committee or one of its subcommittees, who reported that legislative
drafting involves “willful lack of clarity”).
99. Id. at 596–97.
100. Id. at 596 (“This is . . . a political process. Sometimes one cannot allow the perfect to be
the enemy of the good.” (quoting a staffer discussing deliberate ambiguity)).
101. Id. at 596–97.
102. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650, 650–66 (describing the “legislative
evolution” of the pleading standard used in the PSLRA).
103. See infra Part II.C.
104. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650.
105. Id. at 652.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Shields v. Citytrust BanCorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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“saying that scienter existed,” as the Ninth Circuit found. The
PSLRA “purported to resolve this conflict by adopting a uniform
109
standard for pleading scienter, the ‘strong inference’ standard.” But
the pleading issue actually implicated the underlying scienter issue:
whether recklessness suffices, and if so, what recklessness means.
Initially, the House bill required actual knowledge, precluding
recklessness altogether, but the version that passed contained a
110
“strong inference” pleading standard for recklessness. The Senate
bill also contained the strong inference standard, and the relevant
committee report explains this choice as following that of the Second
111
Circuit. But the issue was not that simple. The Second Circuit had
not specified exactly what the strong inference standard required.
Senator Arlen Specter introduced an amendment that included more
112
precise considerations based on Second Circuit case law. The
Senate adopted the amendment, but the conference committee
113
deleted it. The conference committee report contains conflicting
signals on whether the committee preferred a weaker or stronger
114
standard.
Meanwhile, the PSLRA itself “goes to lengths to sidestep the
issue by using ‘required state of mind’ in the pleading provision,
115
rather than knowledge or recklessness.” As Professors Grundfest
and Pritchard explain,
This formulation has the air of a compromise, suggesting that
neither proponents nor opponents of recklessness were capable of
garnering a majority (much less a supermajority) for their view. By

108. Id. (quoting In re Glenfeld, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc)).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 652–53 (“The bill eventually passed by the House . . . codified recklessness as
‘[d]eliberately refraining from taking steps to discover whether one’s statements are false or
misleading.’” (quoting Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 10A(a)(4) (as
passed by the House, Mar. 8, 1995))).
111. See id. at 653 (explaining that the Senate banking committee report clearly stated an
intent to adopt the Second Circuit standard).
112. See id. at 654 (asserting that Senator Specter’s proposed amendment would have made
the law rely more explicitly on the Second Circuit tests).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 655–57 (explaining that the language of the statement of managers section
conflicts with a reasonable interpretation of the concededly vague language of footnote 23 in
that same section).
115. Id. at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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leaving the question unanswered in the statute, both sides could
116
hope that the Supreme Court would eventually rule in their favor.

According to Professors Grundfest and Pritchard, this agreement
to disagree was essential to the passage of the legislation. As further
evidence, the authors note that the Senate barely mustered enough
votes to override a presidential veto—President Clinton’s first, and
117
one based expressly on the pleading standard. In his veto message,
President Clinton stated that he opposed a pleading standard higher
than that of the Second Circuit and highlighted language in the
118
conference committee report that might support such a position.
Preserving the deliberate ambiguity on this issue was critical for
members of Congress: “The loss of even two votes in the Senate due
to disagreement over the ‘strong inference’ standard would have
119
doomed the legislation.” Thus, in the floor debate concerning an
override vote, the Senate managers of the PSLRA who shared the
president’s view of the pleading standard nevertheless distanced
themselves from the president’s remarks as well as the related
conference committee report statements to gain the requisite support
120
for the legislation.
Professors Grundfest and Pritchard join others in contending
that the possibility of deliberate ambiguity creates complications for
121
the dominant theories of statutory interpretation. Those theories,
despite their differences, have a central commonality. They seek
clarity when none may exist or at least where Congress may intend
that none exists. Professors Nourse and Schacter contend that the
dominant theories are therefore either implausible or disingenuous:
“[T]he fictions deployed in judicial opinions are a kind of diversion,
allowing judges to exercise significant discretion in determining

116. Id.
117. See id. at 659.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 660.
121. See, e.g., id. at 667–77 (explaining that the final construction of the PSLRA prompted
the appellate courts to interpret the strong inference standard using three different approaches);
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 616–21 (describing potential flaws in judicial assumptions
about legislative intent that belie the leading theories of statutory interpretation); Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 411 (“[D]ebates about statutory interpretation, in and out of the judiciary, often
dissolve into fruitless and unilluminating disputes about the constraints supplied by language
‘itself’ (as if such a thing could be imagined).”).
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statutory meaning while attributing their discretionary choices to
122
Congress.”
In sum, positive political theorists and legal scholars posit that
Congress may delegate to agencies the task of giving statutory
provisions more precise meaning for certain reasons and under
certain conditions. Although they differ on the details, they agree that
these reasons and conditions are important to thinking about the
legislative design of regulatory statutes. Chevron and Mead are in
general agreement, but they do not adequately integrate these
reasons and conditions into statutory interpretation. For the most
part, they leave in place the conventional theories and those theories’
shared search for statutory meaning. Under these circumstances, it is
questionable whether courts can accurately or reliably determine
whether Congress has delegated interpretive authority to agencies.
II. A DELEGATION-RESPECTING THEORY
This Part imagines what interpretive theory would look like if it
were based on the considerations that are thought to induce Congress
to delegate interpretive authority to agencies. A delegationrespecting theory would require courts to consider indications of
interpretive delegation like the ones that PPT and legal scholarship
have identified. To be clear, I do not claim that either PPT or legal
scholarship provides a means for translating their general hypotheses
or empirical observations about legislative behavior into an
interpretive theory. Rather, I argue that PPT and legal scholarship
identify the right sort of signals for courts to track when interpreting
regulatory statutes. Courts tracking these signals would be less likely
to read statutory language as clear on the assumption that Congress
intended that result.
This Part also addresses how courts, applying a delegationrespecting theory, would handle related issues. If courts generally
disregard statutory language, how would they ensure that agencies
remain within the scope of their delegated interpretive authority? If
courts are generally interested in respecting interpretive delegations,
would they continue to review the reasonableness of agency
interpretations? In the absence of sufficient evidence that Congress

122. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 9, at 619. Grundfest and Pritchard do not challenge
judicial practice but note that it thrusts legislators into a game with courts over whose
interpretive strategy ultimately will prevail. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 670–72.
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delegated interpretive authority to an agency, how would courts
resolve interpretive questions? This Part saves evaluation of the
theory for the final Part.
A. Reasons for Interpretive Delegation
Congress is likely to delegate authority to agencies for
predictable reasons—primarily to avoid resolving complex and
contentious issues that, if resolved, would defeat the enactment of
123
legislation or would generate other costs to legislators. Under a
theory directed at this behavior, courts would identify one or both of
these reasons as evidence of an interpretive delegation by Congress to
the relevant agency. I do not suggest that courts engage in legislative
mind reading, trying to recover actual legislative reasons for
interpretive delegation. Rather, courts should recognize that
Congress is likely to delegate certain issues based on their nature.
Moreover, courts should recognize that this delegating impulse does
not vary whether the grant of authority to the agency is explicit or
implicit. A complex or contentious issue should motivate delegation
to an agency whether Congress responds by enacting an express
mandate or choosing an unspecific term. There is one difference.
Without an express mandate, courts must determine whether an issue
is sufficiently complex or contentious to prompt an interpretive
delegation. To do so, they would examine the text, purpose, and
background of the statute.
Chevron is not contrary to this general focus on the nature of the
issue. It observes that Congress may delegate interpretive authority to
an agency “thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
124
position to do so.” Chevron also acknowledges that Congress may
125
delegate interpretive authority to obtain legislative consensus. But
Chevron does not ask courts to examine whether an issue is complex
or contentious as part of their interpretive delegation analysis, which
is the suggestion here.
If courts are to evaluate the nature of the issue, practical
questions abound. First, what constitutes a complex issue? From a
legislative standpoint, a complex issue is a technical issue, requiring

123. See supra Parts I.B–C.
124. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
125. Id.
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both time and expertise. If the statutory provision later to be
interpreted concerns a technical matter, requiring the acquisition or
assessment of specialized information, it is likely the sort of subject
that generalist staffers or legislators are unwilling or unable to handle,
126
even with the benefit of outside consultants. A provision that
depends on science, economics, or statistics falls into this category. If
a provision requires applying specialized skill, it is also likely the kind
127
that Congress may delegate to agencies. Thus, Congress may
possess information but still encounter difficulty translating that
information into appropriate rules—for example, rules governing
acceptable risk of illness or injury, an acceptable level of drug
effectiveness, or an acceptable degree of market concentration.
A complex issue may also be a subset of a more general issue.
Chevron included as a reason for interpretive delegation that perhaps
128
Congress “simply did not consider the question at this level.”
129
Congress can opt for generality to conserve time. By delegating the
details, Congress may claim credit for broad statutory responses while
130
avoiding blame for inevitable regulatory burdens. Courts need not
focus on the precise legislative gains from generality. Rather, they
might simply attempt to find such generality in the text or structure of
the statute.
Under this approach, when would a court conclude that a
regulatory issue is not so complex as to suggest delegation?
Truthfully, the answer is infrequently. Congress will predictably enlist
agency judgment not only to arrive at wise solutions to public
problems but to avoid the obligation to choose those solutions itself.
Moreover, if Congress has delegated authority to an agency because
of the complexity of a regulatory regime, it likely did not intend to
withhold authority from the agency over interpretive questions.
Those questions are likely to share the same general character as the

126. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65,
76 (1989) (noting that the benefit of agency regulation (compared to tort litigation) increases
“with the degree of specialization and complexity of data and with the greater general need for
the information in the economy”).
127. Cf. id. at 105 (arguing that “courts lack the scientific expertise to develop the necessary
doctrines and causation rules relevant to multiple and probabilistic causation” in toxic tort
cases).
128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
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regulatory regime to which they are relevant. Thus, courts might
expect more often than not to start their interpretive analysis with a
thumb on the scale for interpretive delegation. Under the existing
framework, courts do not start from here. The search for meaning
more likely predisposes them away from interpretive delegation. In
this sense, the approach that I advocate is potentially more
deferential than Chevron.
One might still imagine that some issues are the sort that
Congress did not intend to commit to an agency either because the
agency lacked the requisite expertise or because Congress is capable
of resolving the issue itself. For example, Congress can make moral or
value judgments, such as whether to impose a criminal sanction for a
131
regulatory violation. Even though the regulatory regime is complex,
the sanctions question within it does not involve specialized
knowledge or skill. In this sort of case, complexity, standing alone,
does not indicate an interpretative delegation.
Another common reason for supposing Congress has delegated
interpretive authority to an agency is the need to short-circuit
extended legislative battles over contentious issues. As Chevron
contemplates, it will sometimes be the case that Congress “was unable
to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
132
agency.” A contentious issue is one subject to active debate

131. Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 923 (2007)
(“As designated representatives of the people, members of Congress are both more in touch
with communal perceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and more accountable to the public for the
moral judgments they make than agencies are. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly
made this link, other courts and scholars have highlighted the moral element of criminalization
as a further reason for not extending judicial deference to Justice Department interpretations of
the criminal code.”); see also BREYER, supra note 31, at 107 (arguing that Congress is capable of
making value judgments and so courts should not defer to agencies’ judgments instead).
Another possible example is private rights of action. The Court has held that courts, not
agencies, must determine whether to imply such rights of action. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,
494 U.S. 638, 649–50 (1990) (finding that Congress expressly delegated authority to courts to
determine whether statutes confer private rights of action). Yet, even here, Congress can be
deliberately ambiguous on the issue. See Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action
Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 40 (1979). Furthermore, Professor Matthew
Stephenson has argued that determining whether to imply a private right of action involves the
sort of complex judgment that Congress might seek to avoid. See Matthew C. Stephenson,
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative
Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 127–28 (2005). Thus, private rights of action may or may not be
complex. Cf. id. at 148–70 (arguing that Chevron should automatically apply to agency
determinations on this issue).
132. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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between legislative coalitions, the resolution of which in the statute
for either side might derail the law’s passage. Unlike complex issues,
contentious issues are not evident from the text or structure of the
statute. Courts must look to the surrounding circumstances, as
Professors Grundfest and Pritchard did in examining the PSLRA. As
summarized in Part I, they performed an extensive reconstruction of
the legislative history and political backdrop of the statute, finding an
agreement to disagree on particular issues and consequent delegation
133
of interpretive authority on those issues.
In their example, the interpretive delegation flowed to the courts
134
not the SEC, which illustrates an important point about this factor.
Courts must uncover evidence not only of an agreement to disagree
but also of a consequent delegation to the agency. Congress likely
intended courts to interpret the PSLRA or at least knew that they
would. The explanation is straightforward: courts have been the
primary interpreters of securities law in the context of private class
135
actions. With respect to other statutes, a court might discover an
indication, either in the legislative history or a background norm, that
Congress intended or expected the agency to exercise interpretive
authority.
A court might discover no indication that Congress had any
preference other than to avoid resolving the contentious issue. Under
such circumstances, the contentiousness of the issue alone would not
support a finding of interpretive authority to the agency. Whether the
agency can assert interpretive authority would depend on other
factors. Note, however, that even if courts can claim interpretive
authority, they might exercise that authority differently, as I explain
in Section C.3.
The bottom line is that courts would focus on legislative reasons
for interpretive delegation by examining the nature of the issue.

133. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 650–66; see also supra Part I.C. (explaining
the academic hypothesis that the opposing factions on the “strong inference” issue agreed to
ambiguous language, each hoping the Supreme Court would rule in its favor).
134. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 9, at 667–77.
135. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 381 (2007)
(“There is little dispute about the centrality of private actions in enforcing the complex web of
securities law.”); Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 206–08 (1990) (noting that the SEC’s
approach to insider trading relies on enforcement actions brought by the SEC and managed by
lower courts). But see James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Security Regulation, 57 DUKE
L.J. 625, 630 (2007) (noting that the SEC has issued rules in certain areas).
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Courts would view Congress as having delegated interpretive
authority to an agency when confronted with a complex or
contentious issue. When courts identified issues as such, they would
be building an affirmative case for interpretive delegation. The
stronger the affirmative case, the less courts should regard the text as
a legislative attempt at a clear meaning that bars the interpretive
delegation.
B. Conditions of Interpretive Delegation
A focus on legislative reasons is only half the case. When
Congress delegates for any reason, it has an ongoing interest in
ensuring that subsequent agency action tracks legislative
136
preferences. Competing legislative coalitions wish to influence
137
subsequent agency interpretations in their preferred directions. Yet
Congress cannot influence what it cannot see. Thus, Congress is more
likely to delegate under certain conditions—those that facilitate
legislative monitoring of agency interpretations. If courts are going to
build an affirmative case for delegation, they must also focus on these
monitoring conditions.
Administrative procedures are a mechanism that facilitates
138
legislative monitoring.
Mead aligns with this view, making
procedures relevant on the question of legislative intent. This is an
important move in the direction of recognizing appropriate
139
assumptions about legislative behavior in the regulatory context.
Based on that premise, it is no stretch to suggest that courts ought to
recognize procedures as a legislative condition of interpretive
delegation. But Mead botches the implementation. First, it fails to
connect procedures with legislative monitoring. Instead, it links
procedures to rule-of-law values, stating that proper procedures
“foster fairness and deliberation” and “bespeak the legislative type of
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the
140
141
ruling.” Meanwhile, Barnhart v. Walton, which the Court decided
just one term later, highlights other factors, including “the interstitial
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–15.
See supra text accompanying notes 83–90.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
Id. at 230, 232.
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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importance of the question to administration of the statute, the
complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
142
Agency has given the question over a long period of time.” These
cases produce competing frameworks for atypical procedures, which
has confused lower courts and produced conflicting results.
Moreover, neither approach adequately produces a result that
reflects what Congress needs for monitoring purposes. For example, a
court might reject an interpretation rendered through an informal
adjudication because the informal adjudication lacked the “fairness
143
and deliberation” in the sense that Mead means. Yet that particular
procedure may have been sufficient for legislative monitoring
purposes because it provided constituents with access to information
about the agency interpretation ahead of time. A court might approve
an interpretation announced in a brief prepared for court litigation
because the brief reflected the expertise and “careful consideration”
144
that Barnhart contemplates. At the same time, the brief may have
evaded legislative monitoring because it was not available to
constituents in advance of litigation. When focusing on administrative
procedures, courts should consider their strategic use to Congress in
overseeing agency interpretations. In so doing, they would better
track the conditions under which Congress delegates interpretive
authority to agencies.
Second, Mead fails to recognize that sufficiently formal
procedures, if a necessary condition of delegation to an agency,
should count in favor of an interpretive delegation to the agency, not
just against it. Mead deprives agencies of interpretive authority unless
they possess and use sufficiently formal procedures. Thus, it can have
a negative effect on agency interpretive authority. But once an agency
passes Mead muster, courts apply Chevron as usual. In other words,
they search for a meaning behind particular language, as if Congress
intended such a meaning. Courts could infer more of an affirmative
signal from adequate procedures, understanding these procedures as
part of the case for interpretive delegation to the agency. In this way,
procedures would help to displace the search for meaning rather than
145
facilitate it.

142. Id. at 222.
143. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
144. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
145. An agency cannot bootstrap itself into a delegation by using relatively formal
procedures when Congress has not authorized those procedures. If the linchpin is legislative
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Congress can seek other means for ensuring that agency action
146
roughly tracks legislative preferences. It can have a proxy, such as
the party of the president. Or, to go further, Congress can have more
concrete opportunities to assess agency interpretations. For example,
an agency may be involved in drafting the legislation, sharing its
interpretations with legislative staff. If those understandings are
sufficiently specific, Congress may rely on them when enacting
legislation. In addition, an agency may maintain a long-standing
policy or practice that Congress can observe when enacting
legislation. Unlike procedures, agency involvement or long-standing
practice is not evident on the face of the statute. Rather, courts must
determine these aspects from the surrounding circumstances.
Agency involvement or long-standing practice can function in
lieu of procedures from a legislative standpoint, providing sufficient
assurance that agency interpretations will roughly track legislative
preferences. This is one way to understand Barnhart. In Barnhart, the
Court upheld an interpretive delegation not because the procedures
met with the criteria that Mead identifies for “force of law” purposes
but for a host of seemingly unrelated factors. Viewed through a
legislative lens, most of the factors sound like reasons for delegation,
including “the interstitial nature of the legal question,” “the
importance of the question to the administration of the statute,” and
147
“the complexity of that administration.” The final factor—the
“careful consideration that the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time” suggests that the agency policy was well worked
148
out and unlikely to change.
Congress could observe it and
reasonably rely on it. Thus, the Court upheld an interpretive
delegation because Congress had a reason for the delegation and an
assurance that the agency interpretation would mirror its longstanding practice. On this account, Barnhart does not offer an
alternative test for measuring the adequacy of procedures, as lower
courts have concluded. Rather, it offers an example in which
Congress could evaluate the agency interpretation for consistency
with legislative preferences through other means.

intent to delegate, then Congress must intend to provide the agency with interpretive authority.
The agency’s decision to afford Congress practical monitoring opportunities via procedures,
even if beneficial on this ground or others, cannot cure the delegation deficiency.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90.
147. Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222.
148. Id.
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Congress can include procedures notwithstanding a prior agency
interpretation, and it is likely to do so. Procedures are useful for
making policy decisions in general. In addition, authorizing
procedures may suggest that Congress anticipated the possibility of
change and provided for legislative monitoring in the event of change.
Under such circumstances, Congress intended a delegation but not
exclusively in reliance on the prior agency interpretation. Procedures,
more so than the prior agency interpretation, furnish the requisite
assurance that agency interpretations will track legislative
preferences.
To summarize, Congress is more likely to delegate when it can
ensure that subsequent agency interpretations will roughly track
legislative preferences. It can use procedures for that purpose or rely
on positions that the agency has maintained before or taken during
the course of legislative drafting. On the account I defend, courts
would treat the presence of these factors as indications that Congress
intended an interpretive delegation.
C. Application Issues
The purpose of focusing courts on political indicia of interpretive
delegation would be to prevent them from reading statutory language
as clear or otherwise depriving an agency of interpretive authority
based on inappropriate assumptions about legislative behavior. This
Section addresses several residual issues that courts would have to
confront if they adopted this framework: (1) ensuring that agencies
remain within the scope of their delegated interpretive authority,
(2) reviewing the reasonableness of agency interpretations, and
(3) resolving interpretive questions in the absence of sufficient
indications of interpretive delegation to an agency.
1. Scope of Agency Interpretive Authority. Even if courts found
sufficient indications of interpretive delegation to an agency, they
may also encounter instances in which an agency has exceeded the
scope of its authority. Courts would still police this boundary, as they
149
always have done. An agency cannot interpret a statute to reach a
subject that it does not address or to include a policy that it rules

149. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
33 (1983) (“[T]he judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone
of discretion committed to it by its organic act.”).
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150

out. A simple illustration: an agency cannot interpret the word
“clothing” to cover “automobiles,” no matter how broad the
151
interpretive delegation of that term. Congress must be able to rely
on the communicative aspect of words at some very general level, to
limit the reach of a statute and preclude certain considerations. In a
152
sense, the constitutional nondelegation doctrine so requires. Under
the nondelegation doctrine, every regulatory statute must contain an
153
“intelligible principle” constraining and guiding agency action. That
154
intelligible principle can be quite minimal or vague, and it usually is.
Nevertheless, the statute cannot confer a blank check on the
155
agency.
Congress must employ some language that can be
understood to delineate the boundaries of administrative authority.
But courts must be restrained in making scope-of-authority
determinations. When courts consult statutory language to ensure
that the agency has remained within the scope of its power, they must
avoid reintroducing the problematic search for meaning. Thus, courts
should not ask what “clothing” means in a relatively specific sense,
either as written or in light of broad statutory purposes. Rather, they
should seek to determine whether “clothing” as conventionally
defined or understood can include “automobile” without depriving
the statute of a communicative limit. This approach is appropriate
because Congress need not precisely define “clothing” to exclude
“automobile.”
As a practical matter, courts should rarely find that an agency
has exceeded the scope of its authority. The point about “clothing”
and “automobiles” is that agencies may not choose readings that are

150. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 67, at 701 (discussing statutes that, without
dictating a single best policy, “did eliminate certain policies from consideration”).
151. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1543 (2007) (“A customs
statute that imposes a tariff on ‘clothing’ does not impose a tariff on automobiles, no matter
how strong the policy arguments for treating the two kinds of goods alike.”).
152. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (understanding
the nondelegation doctrine as entailing a statutory limit on delegations of authority to agencies).
153. Id.
154. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (acknowledging that
although Congress, when delegating decisionmaking, must establish intelligible principles for
agencies to follow, those principles only must provide minimal guidance); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
155. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542, 541–42 (1935)
(invalidating a statutory delegation that conferred “virtually unfettered” discretion on an
agency); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (invalidating a statutory
delegation for lacking standards).
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so illogical as to constitute virtual category mistakes or polar
opposites. Thus, a statute directing an agency to regulate x does not
156
authorize an agency to regulate y. But the legislative act of
precluding an agency from selecting y does not obligate an agency to
regulate x in any particular manner. Indeed, that act says very little
about x. When an agency regulates x in an unreasonable manner, a
court should not conclude that the agency has exceeded the scope of
its authority. Courts should instead address such errors through a
different, more forgiving channel, as Section C.2 shows.
2. Reasonableness of Agency Interpretations. Asking courts to
use different proxies for determining whether Congress has delegated
interpretive authority would not diminish courts’ responsibility to
evaluate the reasonableness of an agency interpretation. Courts have
always reviewed agency interpretations for reasonableness whether
157
under Chevron or the arbitrary and capricious test from the
158
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Although the relationship
between the Chevron inquiry and the arbitrary and capricious test has
159
confused courts, the effect of each is much the same. Agency
interpretations, like all agency policy decisions, must comport with
160
the reasoned decisionmaking requirement.

156. Relatedly, when Congress instructs an agency to regulate x, it cannot decline to
regulate one type of x. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007) (finding that
carbon dioxide is an “air pollutant” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act and therefore that
the statute “forecloses” the EPA’s contrary reading).
157. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(explaining that agency interpretations are valid unless “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute”).
158. See 5 U.S.C § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law . . . .”).
159. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 85, 96–102 (John F.
Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (noting confusion among courts concerning the relationship
between Chevron Step Two and APA arbitrary and capricious analysis and arguing that the two
should mirror one another); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116
YALE L.J. 952, 1005–07 (2007) (demonstrating that Chevron Step Two incorporates the
reasoned decisionmaking requirement).
160. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41, 43
(1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
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The reasoned decisionmaking requirement has a long lineage in
161
It rests on certain
administrative law, predating the APA.
assumptions about the administrative process—that absent judicial
supervision, agencies would be insufficiently attentive to certain
considerations, whether statutory factors, policy aspects, alternative
162
solutions, or party comments. Courts have sought to address these
pathologies by asking agencies to issue along with their decisions an
163
explanation for those decisions. The reasoned decisionmaking
requirement serves important normative values. For example, the
requirement ensures that agency decisionmaking comports with rule164
of-law values, like rationality and consistency. In addition, it ensures
that the administrative process is transparent and accessible,
165
enhancing political accountability and public participation.
It is possible to challenge the validity of these assumptions or the
pursuit of these goals. I believe that preserving reasonableness review
becomes even more important once courts adopt a different approach
to statutory interpretation. Administrative law becomes the main
vehicle for disciplining agency interpretations that depart from
accepted norms, such as rationality and accountability. I discuss in
Part IV the role of administrative law in responding to additional
concerns about agency interpretations.
3. Exercise of Judicial Interpretive Authority. If a court fails to
find an interpretive delegation to the agency involved, the court
possesses the relevant interpretive authority. This is not surprising: if
an agency has no interpretive authority, then it follows that the court
must. But the issue is actually more complicated. How courts should
exercise interpretive authority depends on why they possess such
authority. Existing law tracks this insight in some places and not in
others.

161. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749, 1777–78 (2007) (tracing the pre-APA roots of the reasoned decisionmaking
requirement).
162. Id. at 1778–79 (describing the function of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement);
see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41 (listing considerations agencies might neglect).
163. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (requiring the agency to explain the basis for its
decision); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 419–20 (1971)
(same).
164. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1778–79.
165. See id. at 1779.
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Assume a court finds that an agency lacks interpretive authority
because Congress had no reason to delegate. The issue is not
technical. The agency involved possesses no relevant expertise for
resolving it. No evidence suggests that the issue generated any
controversy that might have obstructed the law’s passage. The
reasonable inference under these circumstances is that Congress did
not intend to delegate the issue at all—for resolution by any other
actor, agency, or court. Congress either misstated its intent or struck a
deal. As a result, courts should interpret any awkwardness or
imprecision in the statutory text as matching their customary
assumptions about legislative behavior. If ever there is a place for
Chevron as usual, this is it.
Assume a court finds instead that Congress agreed to disagree
but designated the courts as the relevant interpreter—as in the
PSLRA context. Courts have special experience interpreting
securities laws in class action suits. When courts are recipients of
delegated interpretive authority, should they exercise their authority
by applying the conventional theories of statutory interpretation?
Because Congress had in mind no specific meaning for the relevant
statutory language, courts are justified in relying less on the
traditional tools of statutory construction, particularly textual
analysis. For guidance, they might consult other sources, such as the
agency’s practical experience with the regulatory regime. This
166
approach mirrors the one from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which
directs courts to consult the agency’s views of wise policy if they are
167
“persuasive.”
What if Congress failed to authorize procedures that facilitate
legislative monitoring? This deficit suggests that Congress did not
intend to delegate interpretive authority to the agency. Otherwise, it
would have sought a means for ensuring that the agency did not
depart from legislative preferences. Assuming no agency involvement
or longstanding practice, Congress likely intended the statutory
language to be clear, or it meant to delegate interpretive authority to
courts. In either case, courts fill any gaps. Existing law does not
attempt to isolate the difference, but the difference is worth knowing
if possible. Again, if the statute delegates interpretive authority to
courts, they could rely less on traditional tools of statutory

166. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
167. Id. at 140.
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construction and more on the agency’s practical experience with the
regulatory regime.
Finally, Congress might have provided sufficiently formal
procedures, but the agency failed to employ them. Because the
agency failed to abide by an essential condition of its delegation,
courts are the default interpreters. The idea is not that Congress
would prefer a judicial interpretation. It is that agencies must
internalize the costs of foregoing proper procedures. Agencies must
face a penalty for fencing Congress out of the process. They run the
risk of losing their preferred interpretations, especially as those
interpretations are more adventurous than courts would be willing to
168
accept based on their standard approaches. The result is that
agencies choose procedures for interpretations that make significant
moves from the status quo.
But when Congress provided procedures that the agency failed
to follow, courts are not the permanent interpreters. They possess
authority not because Congress preferred judicial resolution but
because the agency involved failed to abide by a condition of its
delegation. All else equal, Congress preferred administrative
resolution. Consequently, an agency may reverse the judicial
interpretation if it uses sufficiently formal procedures in the future.
Duly authorized agency interpretations take priority over judicial
interpretations, much as statutes do. This result tracks the reasoning
in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
169
Services.
*

*

*

Courts must consider the reasons for and conditions of
interpretive delegation to agencies if they are interested in
recognizing the existence of such delegation. Courts identifying these
factors would be less likely to find clear meaning when Congress
likely intended none to exist. The existing framework views Congress
as pursuing particular legislative deals or broad statutory purposes—

168. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 528, 531 (2006) (arguing that agencies, to secure approval for their interpretations from
courts, choose textually plausible interpretations when they want to avoid the costs of issuing
more aggressive interpretations through formal procedures that also satisfy courts).
169. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84
(2005).
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and, in both cases, commits courts to search for a meaning behind
statutory language.
Under this new approach, courts would still retain their essential
functions. They would ensure that agencies stay within the scope of
their delegated authority and issue reasonable interpretations. Courts
would also possess interpretive authority when an agency lacks it.
Existing administrative law doctrine provides the basic guidance for
these inquiries. It is not far off in this context. But even here, the
judicial posture would be different.
III. ILLUSTRATIONS
So far this discussion has been fairly abstract, suggesting
particular factors for courts to examine in interpreting regulatory
statutes and showing how these factors differ from the existing
framework. This Part offers two examples in which members of the
Court actually may be understood as applying approaches remarkably
like the interpretive theory that this Article envisions. The examples
help to flesh out the theory.
The first example is Zuni Public School District No. 89 v.
Department of Education. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
examined the considerations that matter to Congress when delegating
authority to agencies and regarded the statutory text as having a less
significant role. His colleagues, including those that agreed with his
conclusion, took issue with his approach on the very question that this
Article raises: which interpretive theory best positions courts to
respect congressional will in the regulatory context?
The second example is Gonzales v. Oregon. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, is best explained in terms of the
delegation considerations that this Article presents. The decision is
instructive at another level. It shows that the Court, employing better
assumptions about legislative behavior, does not always find an
interpretive delegation to the agency involved. Meanwhile, the
dissenting opinion demonstrates the pitfalls of textualism, even when
used to uphold an agency interpretation.
A. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education
Zuni involved what looked like a difficult but not atypical issue
of statutory interpretation. The Federal Impact Aid Act contains a
method for the secretary of education to use when determining
whether a state’s public school funding program “equalizes
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expenditures” among that state’s public school districts. Only if a
state’s program equalizes expenditures may the state use federal aid
171
to reduce its own local funding. According to the statute, a state’s
program equalizes expenditures when the disparity in per-pupil
172
expenditures does not exceed 25 percent. But, when doing so, the
secretary is to “disregard” school districts “with per-pupil
expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile
173
of such expenditures . . . in the State.” The secretary issued a series
of regulations, in place for thirty years, interpreting the so-called
174
essentially to allow the secretary to
“‘disregard’ instruction”
consider “the number of the district’s pupils as well as . . . the size of
175
the district’s expenditures per pupil.” For New Mexico’s local
district aid program, which applied to the petitioner, the secretary
calculated expenditures, consistent with its regulations, as follows for
fiscal year 2000:
Department officials listed each of New Mexico’s 89 local school
districts in order of per-pupil spending . . . . After ranking the
districts, Department officials excluded 17 school districts at the top
of the list because those districts contained (cumulatively) less than
5 percent of the student population; for the same reason, they
excluded an additional 6 school districts at the bottom of the list.
The remaining 66 districts accounted for approximately 90
percent of the State’s student population. Of those, the highest
ranked district spent $3,259 per student; the lowest ranked district
spent $2,848 per student. The difference, $411, was less than 25
percent of the lowest per-pupil figure, namely $2,848. Hence, the
officials found that New Mexico’s local aid program qualifies as a
176
program that “equalizes expenditures.”

Zuni Public School District sought review of the agency’s
findings, conceding that the calculations were correct under the
regulations but arguing that the regulations were inconsistent with the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 7709(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i).
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1538−39 (2007).
Id. at 1538.
Id. at 1540 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1) (2000)).
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statute. Zuni contended that the statute required the secretary to
calculate the upper and lower percentile cutoffs “solely on the basis
of the number of school districts (ranked by their per-pupil
expenditures), without any consideration of the number of pupils in
178
those districts.” Under Zuni’s method, “only 10 districts (accounting
for less than 2 percent of all students) would have been identified as
the outliers” and “[t]he difference, as a result, between the highest
and lowest per-pupil expenditures of the remaining districts (26.9
179
percent) would exceed 25 percent.” The statute thus would “forbid
New Mexico to take account of federal impact aid as it decides how to
180
equalize school funding across the State.”
After the Tenth Circuit affirmed the secretary’s decision by a
split vote of a twelve-member en banc panel, the Court took the case
181
to consider the interpretive question. Justice Breyer wrote the
opinion for the majority, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
182
and Alito joined with several separate concurrences. Justice Breyer
began the customary way, citing Chevron and noting that “Zuni’s
183
strongest argument rests upon the literal language of the statute.”
But rather than considering that argument at the outset, as Chevron
instructs, Justice Breyer made an unusual move. He wrote, “For
purposes of exposition, we depart from a normal order of discussion,
namely an order that first considers Zuni’s statutory language
argument. Instead, because of the technical nature of the language in
question, we shall first examine the provision’s background and basic
184
purposes.” He found that “[c]onsiderations other than language
provide us with unusually strong indications that Congress intended
to leave the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us
185
and that the Secretary’s chosen method is a reasonable one.”
The first consideration was the complexity of the issue. Justice
Breyer stated that “the matter at issue—i.e., the calculation method
for determining whether a state aid program ‘equalizes
expenditures’—is the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1537.
Id. at 1540.
Id. at 1541 (citation omitted).
Id.
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matter that Congress often does not decide itself, but delegates to
186
specialized agencies to decide.” The second consideration was the
“history” of the statute, suggesting that Congress has ample
opportunity to monitor the agency interpretation, which predated the
187
statute. The secretary had promulgated the regulation at issue in
188
1976 under a 1974 version of the federal aid statute. Meanwhile, in
the ensuing twenty years until Congress enacted the version of the
statute at issue in the case, “no Member of Congress has ever
criticized the method the 1976 regulation sets forth nor suggested at
189
any time that it be revised or reconsidered.” In addition, the
secretary himself had sent the relevant statutory language to
Congress in 1994, and Congress “adopted that language without
190
comment or clarification.”
The third consideration was the reasonableness of the secretary’s
interpretation in light of the purpose of the statutory disregard
191
instruction. Justice Breyer relied on the secretary’s explanation for
how the secretary’s interpretation squared with the purpose of the
192
disregard instruction, rather than supplying his own. The secretary
193
had provided that explanation along with its regulation in 1976.
The final consideration was the language of the statute, which
Justice Breyer consulted to ensure that the agency had not acted
194
outside the basic scope of its authority. What Justice Breyer looked
for was a truly clear meaning or an “absolute literalness,” which he
illustrated as follows: “A customs statute that imposes a tariff on
‘clothing’ does not impose a tariff on automobiles, no matter how
strong the policy arguments for treating the two kinds of goods
195
alike.” The words of the Federal Impact Aid Act were not as easily
understood as “clothing” or “automobiles.” Justice Breyer therefore
sought outside assistance. He found that every mainstream and

186. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(1) (2000)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1541–42.
193. Id. at 1541.
194. Id. at 1543 (“[N]ormally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the
Secretary’s method would be determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously
indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Secretary’s interpretation.”).
195. Id.
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technical dictionary—Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
an economics dictionary, a mathematics dictionary, a science
dictionary, and a medical dictionary—defined “per-pupil” the way
196
Furthermore, other education-related
that the secretary did.
197
statutes also supported the interpretation. In addition, the “more
general circumstance[s]” surrounding the statute confirmed the
198
Finally, Justice Breyer gathered
ambiguity of the phrase.
“reassurance from the fact that no group of statisticians, nor any
individual statistician, has told us directly . . . that the language before
199
us cannot be read as we have read it.” He found this consideration
“significant” because the words are “technical, and we are not
200
statisticians.” The “upshot,” he said, is that “the language of the
201
statute is broad enough to permit the Secretary’s reading.” For
reasons that he had previously stated, he concluded that “the
202
Secretary’s reading is a reasonable reading.”
Justice Breyer’s opinion drew criticism from all of his colleagues
203
except Justice Ginsburg. Four Justices wrote separate statements,
each reflecting a commitment to an alternative theory of statutory
interpretation—or at least obedience to the Chevron doctrine as
204
traditionally applied. Justice Stevens preferred intentionalism. He
joined the majority opinion because he agreed that the text was
205
“sufficiently ambiguous to justify the Court’s exegesis.” He said that
the better approach, however, was to acknowledge that the
“legislative history is pellucidly clear and the statutory text is difficult
206
to fathom.” In his view, “this is a quintessential example of a case in
which the statutory text was obviously enacted to adopt the rule that
the Secretary administered both before and after the enactment of
207
the rather confusing language” at issue. Thus, Congress had a clear

196. Id. at 1543–44.
197. Id. at 1545.
198. Id. at 1545–46.
199. Id. at 1546.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1549–50 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1550–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
1551–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1549–50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 1550.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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208

“intention on the precise question at issue.” Citing Church of the
209
Holy Trinity v. United States, Justice Stevens stated that he would
not upset this interpretation even if he thought that the literal reading
210
were correct.
Justice Kennedy concurred, joined by Justice Alito, also
211
expressing concern about the Court’s analysis. In his view, the
Court was “correct to find that the plain language of the statute is
212
ambiguous.”
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he
213
opinion of the Court . . . inverts Chevron’s logical progression.” He
worried that “[w]ere the inversion to become systemic, it would
create the impression that agency policy concerns, rather than the
traditional tools of statutory construction, are shaping the judicial
214
interpretation of statutes.” Although he believed that the Court had
not fulfilled its “obligation to set a good example,” he was willing this
time to give Justice Breyer the benefit of the doubt “in matters of
215
exposition.”
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
216
Justice Thomas, and in part by Justice Souter. He took issue with
the Court’s chosen interpretation as well as its overarching mode of
analysis. First, he castigated Justice Breyer for treating the
interpretive question in the case as a “scary math problem,” requiring
a “hypothetical cadre of number-crunching amici to guide [the]
217
way.” He also decried the “sheer applesauce” of Justice Breyer’s
interpretation, which required a number of steps to get from local
school districts to populations in those school districts to average per218
pupil expenditures. He read the words as they were written,
219
refusing to consult dictionaries or statisticians. The contested phrase

208. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984)).
209. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
210. Zuni, 127 S. Ct. at 1550 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459).
211. Id. at 1550–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 1551.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1553 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1554.
219. Id.
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was “local educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures.”
Carefully dismantling the Court’s interpretation, he argued that perpupil expenditure could not refer to the students themselves, but only
221
to the local school districts.
Turning to the interpretive methodology, Justice Scalia rebuked
Justice Breyer for applying intentionalism. Declaring that “today
Church of the Holy Trinity arises, Phoenix-like, from the ashes,” he
characterized Justice Breyer’s opinion as “nothing other than the
elevation of judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory
222
text.” Against this approach he offered a broad defense of
textualism. Justice Scalia stated that “once one departs from ‘strict
interpretation of the text’ . . . fidelity to the intent of Congress is a
chancy thing” because “[t]he only thing we know for certain [is that]
both Houses of Congress (and the President, if he signed the
223
legislation) agreed upon . . . the text.” He dissected each piece of
evidence on which Justice Breyer relied, showing that Congress could
have just as easily intended to depart from the secretary’s
224
interpretation.
These concurring and dissenting Justices, though reflecting
differences among themselves, all thought that Justice Breyer failed
to serve as a faithful agent of Congress. But they misperceived his
approach. Justice Scalia assumed that it was intentionalism. But an
intentionalist would have found, as Justice Stevens did, that Congress
intended to select a specific policy—the methodology that the
secretary had adopted—whereas Justice Breyer found only that
Congress has intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
secretary, who in turn had selected the policy. Justice Kennedy
thought that Justice Breyer departed from legislative intent and
undermined judicial authority by elevating agency policy over the
traditional tools of statutory construction. If he did, it was in pursuit
of a theory that reflected better assumptions about legislative

220. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).
221. Id. at 1554–55.
222. Id. at 1551.
223. Id. at 1556 (quoting id. at 1549 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
224. Id. at 1556–59. Justice Souter felt similarly constrained by the strict meaning of the text
and joined that part of Justice Scalia’s dissent, though not the broader defense of textualism. See
id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Court that “Congress probably intended, or
at least understood, that the Secretary would continue to follow the methodology devised prior
to passage of the current statute in 1994” but finding the language “unambiguous and inapt to
authorize that methodology”).
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behavior. Indeed, the traditional tools prevented the other Justices
from serving as faithful agents of Congress. Nowhere was this more
evident than in the dissent. Justice Scalia focused on the words as
written, on the assumption that interpreters can know no more about
Congress than what it writes. Justice Breyer showed that interpreters
might know much more about Congress if only they read the words of
the statute in their political context rather than for their narrowest
meaning.
But the critics were right in one respect. Justice Breyer did not
225
fully acknowledge the significance of his interpretive approach. He
did not merely invert Chevron. He changed the unit of analysis from
statutory meaning to interpretive delegation. Why did he? As
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have determined, Justice
Breyer is already “the most deferential justice” on the sitting Court
226
without the benefit of any novel approach. Furthermore, he had five
votes for deference in this case under the traditional approach. Would
a new approach allow Justice Breyer to teach others what his early
227
experience with the legislative process had taught him? If so, his
lesson is worth serious consideration.

225. The parallels have some limits: Justice Breyer has stated that he would not defer to
agency interpretations on “question[s] of national importance,” including those that concern the
scope of a statute, because Congress (or a reasonable member of Congress) would not intend to
delegate these issues. BREYER, supra note 31, at 107. He has also stated that reasonable
legislators would decide how to allocate interpretive authority to “help[] the statute work
better . . . in both the functional and the democratic sense of the term,” rather than for more
strategic reasons. Id. at 108.
226. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826 (2006) (reporting that Justice Breyer is
“the most deferential justice in practice,” whereas Justice Scalia is the least deferential); see also
Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent,
Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 785 (2007)
(observing that Justice Breyer has “long favored . . . . mandatory deference in the more routine
or interstitial interpretations, but not necessarily in matters at the core of the statutory design”).
227. See BREYER, supra note 31, at 106 (arguing that courts should examine considerations
beyond statutory language to determine what a “reasonable member of Congress” would intend
when allocating interpretive authority); Stephen Breyer, Lecture, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 267 (2002) (arguing that judges should vary how much deference they
show to an agency interpretation based on how much deference Congress wanted courts to
show). In addition to teaching and writing in administrative law before becoming a judge,
Justice Breyer served as special counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary and as
chief counsel of the committee. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
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B. Gonzales v. Oregon
Gonzales concerned an interpretation extending the reach of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the regulation of physician228
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued this
assisted suicide.
229
in the wake of an Oregon law that legalized
interpretation
physician-assisted suicide, “without consulting Oregon or apparently
230
anyone outside his Department.” According to the interpretation,
physician-assisted suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” for
which physicians might dispense and prescribe controlled substances
231
under the CSA and accompanying regulations. Physicians who
dispense and prescribe controlled substances to assist suicide violate
the CSA and jeopardize their federal registrations to prescribe
controlled substances for other purposes, even if “state law authorizes
232
or permits such conduct.”
The Court held that Congress has not delegated authority to the
233
attorney general to issue the interpretation. Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor,
234
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The Court acknowledged that the
language of the CSA was ambiguous, which ordinarily supports
235
agency delegation under Chevron. Nevertheless, it refused to
presume that Congress implicitly would grant the executive branch
such “broad and unusual” authority to criminalize an act that is legal
236
under state law. Quoting earlier cases applying the “extraordinary”
question principle, it noted that Congress is unlikely to “hide
237
elephants in mouseholes.” The Court continued, explaining that

228. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 911 (2006).
229. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608
(Nov. 9, 2001), invalidated by Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925–26.
230. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913.
231. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608 (quoting
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2001)); see also Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 913–14 (quoting Attorney
General Ashcroft’s ruling in Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 56,608).
232. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist
Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608).
233. Id. at 916–22.
234. Id. at 910.
235. Id. at 916 (“All would agree, we should think, that the statutory phrase ‘legitimate
medical purpose’ is a generality, susceptible to more precise definition and open to varying
constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant sense.”).
236. Id. at 921.
237. Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
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“[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which has
been the subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’ across the
country, makes the oblique form of claimed delegation all the more
238
suspect.”
If the Court had said only this much, it would have failed to grasp
the significance of this case. The problem was not simply one of
elephants and mouseholes—for Congress can hide elephants in
mouseholes when those elephants raise technical issues or impede
legislative consensus. But this was not such a case. The question was
239
extraordinary
precisely because the ordinary reasons for
interpretive delegation were not present. As the Court observed, the
decision whether to permit physician-assisted suicide does not raise a
240
technical issue but a moral, legal, and practical issue. Consequently,
there was no reason to presume that Congress intended to delegate
the issue of its meaning to the attorney general. In fact, Oregon had
241
handled the issue through popular means of a voter ballot measure.
Furthermore, no evidence suggested that delegating physicianassistant suicide to the attorney general was essential to the passage
of the CSA. Indeed, Congress generally anticipated state laws
regulating the medical profession, like Oregon’s physician-assisted
242
suicide law. The Court stated that “[t]he structure and operation of
the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning medical profession
243
regulated under the States’ police powers.” If anything, Congress
left the issue of regulating physician-assisted suicide to the states.
The Court offered other considerations that reflected realistic
assumptions about the legislative process. The Court noted that the
attorney general lacks broad rulemaking power to enforce the
244
relevant provisions of the statute. The Court did not connect the
attorney general’s lack of authority with concerns about legislative
monitoring, although no one outside the Department of Justice could
245
observe the interpretation until it was a fait accompli. The Court did

238. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).
239. See id. at 918 (“[T]he Attorney General claims extraordinary authority.”).
240. Id. at 911.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 923 (“Oregon’s regime is an example of the state regulation of medical
practice that the CSA presupposes.”).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 917.
245. See id. at 913 (noting that the attorney general did not consult the state or “anyone
outside his Department”).
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not even decide whether the attorney general could ever issue binding
interpretations through its chosen procedure, an interpretive
246
bulletin. Nevertheless, it acknowledged the importance of the
247
procedural feature to the delegation analysis. Because Congress had
not granted rulemaking power to the attorney general over medical
practices such as physician-assisted suicide, it has not delegated
248
interpretive authority to the attorney general over those practices.
Relatedly, the Court also stated that Attorney General Ashcroft
exercised authority over an issue outside his area of expertise. The
CSA provides the attorney general with authority to regulate “the
registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and
249
dispensing of controlled substances.” Attorney General Ashcroft
asserted a different sort of authority—the authority to determine
whether physician-assisted suicide constitutes a legitimate medical
250
practice. But the definition of medical practice is a technical issue.
The Court stated that Congress tends to delegate in accordance with
whether a particular agency possesses “historical familiarity and
251
policymaking expertise.”
The Court further recognized that
Congress can expect no benefit from delegating the definition of
medical practice to the attorney general, even if it might expect a
252
benefit from delegating that issue to another federal agency.
Although Justice Kennedy purported to apply a fairly standard
interpretive principle—the extraordinary question principle—he
actually engaged a more accurate delegation analysis than that
principle might suggest in other cases. He claimed that Congress was
unlikely to delegate authority over physician-assisted suicide because
253
of the normative significance of such a practice.
Yet he
demonstrated, more realistically, that Congress had little reason to
delegate the issue to any agency and had little opportunity to monitor
246. See id. at 922 (deciding only that the attorney general may not “issue the Interpretative
Rule as a statement with the force of law”).
247. Id. at 921.
248. See id. (“[T]he authority claimed by the Attorney General is both beyond his expertise
and incongruous with the statutory purpose and design.”).
249. Id. at 917 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 821 (Supp. V 2005)).
250. Id. at 921.
251. Id. (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
153 (1991)).
252. See id. (“The structure of the CSA . . . conveys unwillingness to cede medical judgments
to an Executive official who lacks medical expertise.”).
253. See id. (“The importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide . . . makes the
oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”).
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how the attorney general would resolve the issue. He reasoned
essentially that when neither the reasons nor the conditions for
interpretive delegation are present, courts should conclude that
255
Congress intended no such delegation.
Finding no interpretive delegation, the Court considered whether
the attorney general’s interpretation nevertheless was “persuasive”
256
257
under Skidmore. It concluded that the interpretation was not. The
Court read the statute as if Congress had not meant to delegate
authority over conduct like physician-assisted suicide at all, neither to
the agency nor to the courts. Thus, the Court stated that the CSA
“manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally”
258
and, in fact, “presupposes” statutes like Oregon’s. Furthermore,
what limited authority the CSA does delegate to regulate medical
practices goes to the secretary of Health and Human Services, not the
259
attorney general. Finally, the Court applied a traditional tool, a
federalism canon, to resolve any residual statutory ambiguity: “The
background principles of our federal system also belie the notion that
Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate
260
areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.” Given
these reasons, it refused to approve the attorney general’s
261
interpretation.
Justice Scalia dissented, offering a characteristically narrow
reading of the language but this time to support the agency’s
interpretation. Noting that the attorney general has undisputed
authority to regulate prescriptions, Justice Scalia reasoned that the
attorney general therefore has authority to determine that “the
dispensation of a Schedule II substance for the purpose of assisting a
262
suicide is not a ‘prescription’ within the meaning of [the statute]”
because the act of assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical
263
purpose” or otherwise in the public interest. The attorney general

254. See id. at 913 (noting that the attorney general issued the interpretative rule without
consulting legislators).
255. See id. at 916 (finding that Auer and Chevron deference was unwarranted).
256. Id. at 922, 922–25 (applying Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
257. Id. at 922.
258. Id. at 923.
259. Id. at 912, 924.
260. Id. at 925.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 931 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 931, 935.
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may further determine that any physician who writes illegitimate
prescriptions “may ‘render his registration . . . inconsistent with the
public interest’ and therefore subject to possible suspension or
264
revocation under [the statute].” Justice Scalia found that this
interpretation was “the most reasonable” reading of the CSA and
would control regardless of whether the interpretive ruling was
265
entitled to deference.
To summarize, in contrast to Justice Scalia’s textual analysis,
Justice Kennedy’s analysis considered broader indications of
legislative intent to delegate interpretive authority to the attorney
general. In this way, his analysis enabled him to serve as a faithful
agent of Congress. His approach also furthered other important
normative values. By leaving authority to regulate physician-assisted
suicide in the states, Justice Kennedy’s analysis advanced the
principle of federalism. It allowed the states to continue to serve as
laboratories for the experimentation with the regulation of physicianassisted suicide. In addition, it ensured that agencies do not receive
delegated interpretive authority unless they possess the requisite
expertise and accountability for exercising it.
*

*

*

Zuni and Gonzales demonstrate how courts (or the Court) can
focus on factors other than the clarity of statutory language to
determine whether Congress likely delegated interpretive authority
to the agency involved. Justice Breyer inverted Chevron and
examined strategic delegation considerations before determining that
the agency interpretation was reasonable and within the scope of the
statute. Justice Kennedy purported to apply a standard interpretive
principle but did so in appreciation of more realistic assumptions
about the legislative process. Together, these Justices demonstrated
that the focus on indications of interpretive delegation is not one
directional: it can lead to a decision upholding an interpretive
delegation or to a decision rejecting an interpretive delegation.
These opinions also begin to reveal the normative significance of
updating statutory interpretation to better capture the legislative
indicia of interpretive delegation to agencies. Neither Justice

264. Id. at 931 (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001)).
265. Id.
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explained the reason for such a change or even fully acknowledged
how much their opinions departed from the typical framework.
Indeed, it might upset Justice Kennedy to know that his analysis was
unconventional, given his objection to Justice Breyer’s analysis in
Zuni. Nevertheless, each might have felt that their particular
approach would best respect the will of Congress. At the same time,
their approaches placed interpretive authority where other normative
values suggested that it belonged. Agency expertise—and possibly
political accountability—suggested that the agency should have the
interpretive authority in Zuni. But the opposite was true in Gonzales.
Moreover, federalism strongly suggested that the states should have
the authority in Gonzales.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
The evaluation of any interpretive theory lies in the balance of
the goals that it accomplishes. Before turning to objections, it is worth
highlighting the normative advantages of the theory that I have
sketched. As I have shown, my delegation-respecting theory would
enable courts to ascertain congressional will when interpreting
regulatory statutes better than existing theories do. A delegationrespecting theory would therefore better promote the principle of
legislative supremacy in the regulatory context. In enacting regulatory
statutes, Congress can delegate interpretive authority to agencies for
the strategic benefit of the act of delegation itself. A delegationrespecting theory would recognize this meta-aspect of legislative
intent by offering courts appropriate proxies for detecting
interpretive delegations to agencies. Not insignificantly, it also would
place interpretive authority in the hands of those officials best able to
discern and further substantive legislative purposes. Unlike courts,
agencies have a continuous relationship with Congress and may have
266
a better understanding of the general aims of legislation. Put simply,

266. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 71–72 (1994) (“Because of their place in
governance, agencies are both knowledgeable about and responsive to presidential and
congressional preferences.”); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 693 (2007) (noting that agencies interpret statutes in light of many
nontextual considerations, including “the goals of public administration”); Herz, supra note 52,
at 194 (observing that agencies may have participated in drafting, have an “institutional
memory,” and have more familiarity with statutory purposes); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency
Statutory Interpretation, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 9, at 8–9,
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agencies are likely to be the superior purposivists when it comes to
267
resolving interpretive questions that Congress left open.
The theory proposed in this Article has other normative
advantages. The reasons for which Congress delegates certain
interpretive questions often make those questions especially
268
appropriate for agency resolution, as Chevron recognizes. Complex
questions typically benefit from agency expertise, and contentious
legislative issues typically benefit from continuing political debate at
the administrative level. Chevron notes that agencies are more
269
accountable than courts—not directly but through the president.
Beyond these abstractions, both the White House and Congress
270
maintain active interest in agency decisionmaking as it unfolds. The
White House has a regulatory review apparatus and an informal
network for that purpose. Congress can use administrative
procedures to facilitate legislative monitoring. A theory that allows
agencies to possess interpretive authority as often as Congress intends
would promote both agency expertise and political accountability. A
theory that makes proper procedures a condition of delegation also

http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9 (noting that agencies consult legislative history and current
political context, engaging in an interpretive process that is dynamic, because “[i]t is precisely
their job as agents of past congresses and sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the
present” (citing Ed Rubin, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, ISSUES
IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Nov. 2002, art. 2, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2)); Trevor
W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1240
(2006) (“Because they have ‘programmatic responsibility for implementing statutory regimes,’
and because they interact frequently with Congress in the course of discharging that
responsibility, agencies often have a very nuanced sense of congressional aims and statutory
purpose.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary
Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative
History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321 (1990))); Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose
Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV.
579, 586 (1992) (“[A] legislature and the administrative agencies within the same jurisdiction are
linked by an incredibly dense network of relationships and shared activities.”).
267. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 150
(2006) (“[A]gencies may be better than courts at discerning and applying congressional
intent.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 931 (2003) (advocating an institutional approach to Chevron that would envision
agencies as choosing purposivism and courts as deferring to that judgment).
268. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests and is entitled to deference . . . .”).
269. See id. (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is . . . .”).
270. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1804–13 (discussing political involvement in the
administrative process).
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would reinforce rule-of-law values. As Mead suggests, procedural
formality tends to ensure that agency decisionmaking is rational and
271
fair.
At the same time, a theory that deprives agencies of interpretive
authority absent sufficient indications of legislative intent to delegate
would serve beneficial purposes. This negative side is essential to
maintain a claim of legislative supremacy, allowing Congress to
control when not to delegate. In addition, the negative aspect of the
theory would preserve rule-of-law values by withholding interpretive
authority when an agency fails to use proper procedures. Less
intuitively, it would facilitate agency expertise and political
accountability. Without sufficiently formal procedures, there is less
assurance that agency decisionmaking reflects specialized knowledge
rather than tunnel vision or political pressure. There is also less
assurance that agency decisionmaking is transparent and therefore
amenable to political oversight as well as judicial review. Signaling to
agencies that they possess interpretive authority only when Congress
intends would serve legislative supremacy and rule-of-law values, as
well as promote agency expertise and political accountability.
Yet this theory has serious downsides. If Zuni and Gonzales help
to illustrate the theory in this Article, they also confirm that the
theory is complicated—multifactored and context dependent, perhaps
more so than a search for the meaning of statutory words. Justice
Scalia was alarmed in Zuni to think that Justice Breyer was resorting
to Holy Trinity intentionalism, elevating legislative history over
statutory text. But the possibility that Justice Breyer was actually
expanding Mead to include a variety of considerations would send
him through the roof. Justice Scalia has castigated Mead for its
uncertainty from the start, and his prediction about its potential to
272
confuse lower courts has come to pass. In this Part, I address the
institutional costs of the theory outlined in this Article.
In addition, this theory squarely presents the difficulty of using
statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations. Since the
demise of the nondelegation doctrine, courts have relied on statutory

271. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 231–33 (2001) (“Congress
contemplates administrative action . . . when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster [] fairness and deliberation . . . .”).
272. See id. at 241, 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The principle effect [of the majority’s
decision] will be protracted confusion.”). See generally Bressman, supra note 26 (suggesting
confusion over Mead was worse than Justice Scalia had predicted).
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interpretation for this important purpose. In this way, one might say,
Chevron and Mead function just as they should, providing courts with
select opportunities to discipline broad delegations. I show that the
general adoption of a delegation-respecting theory does not prevent
courts from using statutory interpretation in a delegation-restricting
fashion. At the same time, neither courts nor commentators can claim
that such a practice is consistent with the aims of Congress, except in
cases like Gonzales, when the evidence revealed that Congress likely
did not intend the asserted delegation anyway. In light of this fact and
for other reasons, I prefer an alternative method for disciplining
broad delegations when the circumstances suggest a need.
A. Institutional Costs
The objection based on institutional costs is an enlarged version
of the objection that Justice Scalia voiced when he dissented in Mead.
He stated that the decision to inquire into legislative intent to
delegate interpretive authority “makes an ‘avulsive change’ in judicial
review of agency action, the consequences of which ‘will be
273
enormous, and almost uniformly bad.’” As he saw matters, “[w]hat
was previously a general presumption of authority in agencies to
resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been authorized to
enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority,
which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the
274
contrary.” He warned that the decision would confuse the lower
courts. He stated, “We will be sorting out the consequences of the
Mead doctrine, which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for
275
years to come.”
Justice Scalia was correct about the effect of Mead on lower
courts. Those courts have applied inconsistent analyses, vacillating
between the factors that Mead provides and those that Barnhart
276
provides. Indeed, courts in different circuits have split as to the
277
same procedural format. Many have chosen instead to avoid
resolving the procedural question altogether by upholding the agency

273. Bressman, supra note 26, at 1444 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 261 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
274. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (citations omitted).
276. See Bressman, supra note 26, at 1458–64 (“[T]he courts can be sorted into two groups:
those that consider Mead-inspired factors and those that consider Barnhart-inspired factors.”).
277. See id. at 1459–61.
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interpretation under Skidmore rather than Chevron. Although this
avoidance is a practical solution to Mead’s complications, it may
create difficulties should an agency seek to change its interpretation
in the future. When a court upholds an agency interpretation under
Skidmore, it effectively adopts that interpretation. Under Brand X, an
agency may overrule a judicial interpretation only if the underlying
279
statutory language is ambiguous. But the court may have avoided
resolving this issue along with the procedural one, leaving the agency
in a state of uncertainty. Finally, lower courts have used Mead as a
basis for the extraordinary question principle, even though the two
280
can reflect very different assumptions about legislative behavior.
That Congress demands procedures as a condition of delegation does
not mean that it withholds issues for normative reasons, such as the
national significance or jurisdictional nature of the issues.
If Mead alone generates confusion among lower courts, a more
elaborate version could produce disaster. Each factor would permit
room for judgment and variation, potentially producing inconsistent
analyses of the same interpretive issue. The theory would encourage
courts to embrace Skidmore more often than before, reducing agency
flexibility. Finally, the theory would create new opportunities and
incentives for courts to forge questionable default rules for
ascertaining legislative intent.
Although these concerns are legitimate, they should not be
overstated on the basis of lower courts’ experience with Mead. The
Court has made Mead more complicated than it needs to be, and a
theory tied to better assumptions about legislative behavior might
help repair the problem. First, as discussed in Part II.B, a delegationrespecting theory would focus on procedures that facilitate legislative
monitoring, rather than only on abstract rule-of-law values such as
fairness or deliberation. The message to courts would be that proper
procedures are those that furnish constituents with information about
agency action before such action is a fait accompli, so that those
constituents may alert their legislators to intervene in the
administrative process as necessary. Mead was correct under this

278. See id. at 1464–69 (describing how some courts “simply determine that lower-level
Skidmore deference supports the agency’s interpretation”).
279. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005).
280. See Bressman, supra note 26, at 1469–74 (observing that courts are confusing explicit
and implicit delegation questions under Mead).
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analysis. U.S. Customs Service ruling letters are virtually impossible
281
for Congress to monitor, through its constituents or otherwise. They
are issued at a rate of 10,000 to 15,000 per year by forty-six different
offices of the agency without any participatory process or reasoned
282
explanation. Other procedures are better for monitoring purposes.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the paradigm from a legislative
monitoring perspective because it is the most accessible and
283
informative, largely as a result of heavy judicial regulation. But
other procedures might suffice, such as a public hearing preceded by
284
notice and followed by an explanation of the decision.
Second, a delegation-respecting theory could address the shift to
Skidmore by changing the application of that decision. Under the
existing framework, courts can use Skidmore to uphold an agency
interpretation without resolving the procedural question (and often
without declaring whether the statutory text is clear or ambiguous).

281. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1788–96 (drawing a connection between
administrative procedures and legislative monitoring in Mead).
282. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
283. See Bressman, supra note 161, at 1792; see also McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures, supra note 10, at 257–59 (discussing how procedural requirements impact
accessibility).
284. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 419–20 (1971)
(considering an interpretation under a statute requiring “a public hearing conducted by local
officials for the purpose of informing the community about the proposed project and eliciting
community views on the design and route,” followed by an administrative record containing an
explanation of the decision). Interestingly, a harder case is a procedure that Mead approved for
force-of-law purposes: formal adjudication. Formal adjudication does not permit legislative
monitoring because neither constituents nor Congress may freely intervene. Yet it is possible to
embrace Mead on this point. Congress, in designing the adjudicatory agencies, might have
traded away the potential for legislative monitoring in favor of the sort of expertise that the
adjudicatory model delivers—individualized consideration. Cf. Bawn, supra note 92, at 105
(“Members of Congress choose not whether to use statutory provisions to control agencies but
how much control to build into agency procedures at the possible expense of other goals like
technical expertise, due process, and optimal use of information.” (citations omitted)). Or
Congress may have intended that the adjudicatory agencies would, to the extent possible,
resolve interpretive questions through notice-and-comment rulemaking in advance of formal
adjudication. The major adjudicatory agencies like the National Labor Relations Board and the
Federal Trade Commission possess notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. See M.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1399 n.48
(2004). Those agencies have not always used their rulemaking power. See id. at 1399 & n.48
(“The NLRB and the FTC are known for their heavy reliance on adjudication . . . .”).
Furthermore, Congress has seen fit to restrict their choice of procedures. But, as the Court has
recognized, agencies cannot always foresee the need to issue interpretations in advance of
adjudications. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between
proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the
informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
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Under the theory proposed in this Article, Skidmore would no longer
provide an escape route. Courts would undertake the delegation
analysis, which includes the procedural question, in all cases. Thus,
courts could not avoid the procedural question simply by choosing
Skidmore. Courts would still rely on Skidmore-style deference when
an agency failed to use sufficiently formal procedures, but they would
not thereby hamper agency flexibility. Rather, courts would possess
interpretive authority unless the agency overrules the judicial
interpretation by reissuing its own interpretation using sufficiently
formal procedures.
Finally, a delegation-respecting theory could minimize the
misuse of Mead by exposing the assumptions about legislative
behavior on which the decision implicitly relies but fails to fully
implement. Once the procedural factor is understood as mattering to
Congress for strategic reasons, the extraordinary question principle
no longer seems categorically justifiable to discern legislative intent.
That principle reflects a view of Congress as hanging on to certain
issues because of their normative importance—their national
285
significance or their jurisdictional nature. But Congress is unlikely
to hold on to any issue unless doing so serves its own political
interests. Thus, an extraordinary question principle is justifiable as a
matter of legislative intent only to the extent that it overlaps with the
factors that already form part of the new interpretive framework.
Any blanket exemption for matters of great importance does not
follow from Mead’s emphasis on delegation. To survive, the
extraordinary question principle requires a separate democracyforcing justification, as I address in further detail in the next Section.
If critics were to reject all other suggestions from this Article on
institutional grounds, they should still accept the suggestion to
embrace and reform Mead. Mead moves in the right direction by
making delegation rather than meaning the threshold question.
Although it does not go far enough for my purposes, it still serves a
valuable gatekeeper function. By insisting on sufficiently formal
procedures, Mead blocks certain interpretive delegations—those
Congress does not intend. Likewise, it blocks interpretative
delegations that transgress rule-of-law values. At the same time, a

285. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 845, 912–13 (arguing that the Court in Brown
& Williamson addressed a question about the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction and suggesting
that the Court address such questions in future cases at Chevron Step Zero).
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focus on the legislative use of procedures refines the inquiry and
reduces institutional costs.
If Mead is still too much to take despite the clarifications herein,
then one must be prepared to draw a broader lesson from this Article.
Critics of Mead might seek a simpler test, but it should not be the
existing framework. That framework is complicated in its own right,
with courts using different interpretative tools and even using the
same interpretive tools differently. Even if it is simple enough from
an institutional perspective, it is deficient on other grounds. The
search for meaning affords courts too much power to defeat
interpretive delegations when Congress likely intended them and
when they are likely to promote agency expertise and political
accountability. It cannot supply the operative rule, whatever the
institutional strengths.
The appropriate rule under these circumstances is not one that
acts as a judicial gatekeeper. Rather, it is a presumption of deference.
By a presumption of deference, I mean a rule that upholds an agency
286
interpretation so long as it is reasonable. (Admittedly, even this rule
provides room for judicial judgment.) A presumption of deference
strikes a better balance between institutional and normative goals, in
light of legislative realties, than the existing framework. At one time,
Chevron might have furnished a presumption of deference based on
what the Court observed in that case about legislative intent to
delegate. Well before Mead, the search for meaning got in the way.
B. Nondelegation Issues
Another potential problem with a delegation-respecting theory is
how to use statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations in
light of legislative realities. Courts have long used statutory
construction for this purpose, with a significant degree of scholarly
approval. In this Section, I quickly catalogue the main ways courts
have used statutory interpretation to constrain broad delegations. I

286. Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts should look for stripped-down plain
meaning and, finding none, accord deference to the agency interpretation because courts gain
little benefit from probing other interpretive sources, including most textualist sources. ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 183–229 (2006); see also Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 688–708
(advocating an approach that casts “Chevron as a voting rule,” requiring consensus among the
relevant decisionmakers as to the proper interpretation of a statute). My approach would not
reintroduce the search for meaning even in limited form because it still asks a question that risks
judicial misuse.
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briefly demonstrate that such an approach can no longer be
associated, even nominally, with congressional will. Nevertheless, I
show that a delegation-respecting theory does not preclude courts or
commentators from pursuing it. I prefer an alternative approach for
addressing the concerns about broad delegations.
1. The Nondelegation Tools. Ever since the demise of the
nondelegation doctrine in 1935, courts have relied on statutory
interpretation to address their persistent worries about broad
287
delegations.
Broad delegations enable legislators to avoid
responsibility for making hard policy choices while claiming credit for
288
statutory responses. They place policymaking in the hands of
unelected bureaucrats. They supply few standards to prevent agencies
289
from rendering arbitrary decisions. And they erode the structural
safeguards for other values, including federalism and criminal
290
lenity.
Although the Court has been unwilling to enforce
constitutional restrictions on broad delegations, it has used statutory
291
interpretation to respond to these underlying concerns.
It is possible to characterize many interpretive principles—and
even an interpretive theory—as ways to restrict broad delegations.
For example, Professor John Manning has argued that textualism can
292
function as a nondelegation doctrine. By compelling courts to
adhere to the text, textualism effectively prevents Congress from

287. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–18
(collecting tools and principles that enable courts to address concerns about broad delegations
as a matter of statutory construction rather than constitutional law); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000) (noting the judicial turn to
nondelegation canons, which require a clear statement from Congress on policy issues).
288. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 72, at 10.
289. See id. at 14–15 (noting that broad delegation permits agencies to regulate in ways that
restrict individual liberty without a sufficiently public purpose); Bressman, Schechter Poultry at
the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1416 (noting that a lack of statutory standards permits
arbitrariness).
290. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1385 (2001) (stating that a presumption against preemption forces Congress to provide states
with notice of when their interests are at stake, enabling them to fight for protection in the
legislative process). But see Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 175, 182–87 (arguing that any clear rule—including the opposite presumption in favor
of preemption—would provide states with notice, and arguing more generally that a
presumption against preemption cannot be justified on any of the asserted grounds).
291. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–18
(collecting interpretive principles for narrowing broad delegations); Sunstein, supra note 287, at
338 (identifying certain canons of construction as means for narrowing broad delegations).
292. See, e.g., Manning, Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, at 702–25.
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delegating interpretive authority to individual legislators through
293
legislative history. Legislators have incentives to carefully consider
the deals they strike because they cannot effectively undo those deals
through legislative history. In addition, selected legislators are not
making law for the whole. The people are entitled to policy made by a
majority of their elected representatives, not a few.
Textualism can operate as a nondelegation doctrine in another
sense. As Justice Scalia has noted, textualism is useful for defeating
the sort of ambiguity that affords agencies room to expand their
294
regulatory authority. Courts can construe language as clear and as
foreclosing the asserted delegation. In this way, courts can prevent
statutes from going too far.
So-called “nondelegation canons” and clear statement rules
serve a similar purpose, although they do not always deny textual
295
ambiguity. Rather, these principles refuse to take that ambiguity as
authorizing an expansive agency interpretation. Thus, the Court has
held that Congress would not delegate interpretive authority to
agencies over extraordinary questions without expressly so stating. In
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
296
Co., the Court refused to permit the Federal Communications
297
Commission (FCC) to read the words “modify any requirement” as
allowing the agency to essentially eliminate a central requirement for

293. See id. at 690–95 (arguing that the ultimate concern about legislative history is
legislative self-dealing); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to
Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1529 (2000) (“If the judiciary accepts certain types of
legislative history (committee reports and sponsors’ statements) as ‘authoritative’ evidence of
legislative intent in cases of ambiguity, then the particular legislators who write that history (the
committees and sponsors) effectively settle statutory meaning for Congress as a whole.”).
294. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 521.
295. See Elhauge, supra note 51, at 2051–55 (describing many canons as useful for eliciting
congressional responses); Sunstein, supra note 287, at 338 (characterizing certain exceptions to
Chevron as nondelegation canons that require a clear statement from Congress on policy
issues); see also Williams N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 388–89 (1991) (arguing that the rule of lenity helps to elicit
congressional responses); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can
Include the Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18–37 (2007) (arguing that a presumption
against preemption would improve the legislative process in general because state laws often
bring critical issues to national attention that Congress might otherwise be inclined to avoid);
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346–47
(noting the argument that the rule of lenity serves a nondelegation function).
296. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
297. Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2000)).
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all long-distance carriers except the dominant one. Likewise, in
299
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court refused to
permit the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to interpret the
words “drug” and “delivery device” as allowing the agency to
regulate the manufacture and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco
300
products. As Justice Scalia remarked, Congress does not “hide
301
elephants in mouseholes.” In other words, Congress does not
delegate interpretive authority to agencies over issues of such
economic or social significance through mere ambiguity.
The Court has sought to protect federalism interests through an
analogous strategy. Federal statutes often conflict with state laws, yet
they contain an ambiguous preemption provision or no preemption
302
provision at all. Agencies then issue interpretations concerning the
preemptive effect of their statutes and regulations. In many of these
303
cases, the Court has invoked a presumption against preemption. It
has demanded a clear statement from Congress before allowing an
304
agency interpretation to preempt state law.
The Court has also refused to read ambiguities as granting
agencies the authority to raise constitutional questions. In Solid Waste

298. See id. at 231 (“It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of
whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—
and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to
‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”).
299. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
300. See id. at 160 (“[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a
decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”).
301. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Some scholars have agreed
that certain questions are too significant for Congress to delegate through ambiguity. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2173–75 (2004) (arguing that agency interpretations of the scope of
their own regulatory power should be given Skidmore, rather than Chevron, deference).
302. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 243 (2007) (“The regulatory preemption
debate centers on the extent to which [agency interpretations] go beyond simply reciting the
preemptive effect of the governing statute or regulation promulgated within the agency’s
delegated authority, and instead attempt to discern the proper scope of preemption with little or
no direction from Congress.”).
303. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[W]e ‘start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985))); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron
and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 738–40 (2004) (describing cases).
304. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
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Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
the Court applied the “avoidance of questions” canon to invalidate an
agency interpretation that raised a question under the Commerce
306
Clause. In this way, the avoidance canon prevents agencies from
taking statutes into constitutional gray zones.
The Court has held that Congress does not intend for agencies to
interpret ambiguities in criminal sanctions provisions. Rather, the
Court has invoked the rule of lenity to interpret those provisions
307
when necessary to protect potential criminal violators. Although the
rule of lenity is not a constitutional requirement, it is a wellestablished norm for interpreting ambiguities in federal criminal
308
statutes. It affords criminal defendants notice of prohibited conduct,
protection against overzealous prosecution, and freedom from
309
unauthorized liberty deprivation.
2. The Normative Difficulty. The theory proposed in this Article
does not prevent courts from vindicating nondelegation or other
values through statutory interpretation. But courts pursuing any of
these strategies must stick to their normative justifications. Many of
these tools have always had at least some nominal association with
the legislative design of statutes. Thus, textualism presumes that
Congress cuts deals, and legislative history should not frustrate them.
The nondelegation canons presume that Congress intends to withhold
certain issues from agency control because of the normative values
that they implicate—whether matters of constitutional structure or
310
individual liberty. The difficulty is that courts and commentators
can no longer regard the nondelegation tools in the same light.
305. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
306. Id. at 172–73. For discussion and examples of the doctrine of avoidance, see Adrian
Vermeule, Savings Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948–49 (1997).
307. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 985
(2005) (suggesting that a court might employ the rule of lenity to declare a statute unambiguous,
thereby precluding deference to the agency).
308. See Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (2006) (characterizing the rule of lenity as a “common-law
tradition”); Hickman, supra note 131, at 935 (“Lenity’s status as an absolute constitutional
requirement rather than a quasi-constitutional canon of construction is questionable.”); Kahan,
supra note 295, at 346–47 (describing the rule of lenity as a “quasi-constitutional” doctrine).
309. See Kahan, supra note 295, at 346–47 (making these observations about the rule of
lenity).
310. Many scholars do not rely on the association with legislative intent in defending the
nondelegation canons. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 27, at 2052–53 (noting the importance of
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To see this point, take two examples: extraordinary questions
and preemption questions. Congress can delegate interpretive power
to agencies over extraordinary questions because of the complexity of
311
the underlying regulatory issues. The FCC must ensure that the
dominant carrier does not possess monopoly power while allowing
new entrants to flourish, calibrating the statute’s requirements
312
accordingly. The FDA must consider the health effects of particular
products, evaluating their safety and efficacy by relying on scientific
studies and medical judgments. Furthermore, Congress authorized
the agencies to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for regulating in
313
their respective domains. Congress may not have anticipated the
precise interpretations, concerning the tariff-filing requirement and
tobacco products. But Congress frequently thinks only in general
terms. Courts cannot effectively undermine the delegation by later
attributing the extraordinary nature of the question to Congress. In
fact, the evidence that Congress did not intend the FDA to regulate
tobacco did not have to do with the enacting Congress. Rather, it
314
concerned subsequent Congresses and subsequent legislation.
Similarly, Congress can delegate preemption questions when
they are complex or technical. Banking law is an illustration. The
National Bank Act grants national banks the power to engage in
mortgage lending, subject to regulation by the Office of the

“constitutional guideposts,” including substantive and procedural fairness, when judges
interpret criminal statutes); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–
49 (2005) (defending a presumption against preemption as “a normative rule of construction,
which means it cannot be grounded in some descriptive judgment about Congress’s intent in
enacting the relevant statute”).
311. Congress may not even be able to distinguish between extraordinary and routine
questions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law
Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2606 (2006) (“[N]o simple line separates minor or interstitial from major
questions.”); id. at 2604 (noting that the line between jurisdictional questions and others is “far
from clear”).
312. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220–21 (1994) (cataloguing the
development of FCC regulations restricting the monopoly power of dominant carriers).
313. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2006) (authorizing the FDA specifically to conduct notice-andcomment rulemaking); MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220–37 (acknowledging the
authority of the FCC to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking).
314. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 137–38, 144–61 (2000)
(consulting later-enacted statutes to confirm interpretation of a prior statute). Such evidence is
arguably relevant to the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. See Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 779–80 (2007); Elhauge,
supra note 51, at 2148 (arguing that agency interpretations are not reasonable if they conflict
with current enactable congressional preferences).
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315

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). It also grants national banks
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
316
business of banking.” The act further grants “visitorial powers” (the
power to “inspect, examine, supervise, and regulate the affairs of an
317
entity and to enforce compliance with applicable laws” ) over
national banks to the OCC and provides that “[n]o national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by
318
Federal law.” Thus, states are effectively preempted from exercising
visitorial powers over national banks under their own laws. The OCC
issued a rule interpreting this provision as preempting the states from
exercising visitorial powers over operating subsidiaries of national
319
banks. National banks have authority to conduct business through
operating subsidiaries as part of their “incidental powers,” and the
rule defined operating subsidiaries as separately incorporated
320
divisions or departments of the parent bank. As a result of the rule,
Michigan could not permit its officials to exercise examination and
enforcement authority over mortgage lending by operating
321
subsidiaries of a national bank.
322
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. the Court confronted the
323
question whether the OCC rule was entitled to Chevron deference.
The Court refused to decide, finding the level of deference
“academic” because the interpretation matched the Court’s own
324
interpretation of the statute. The theory offered in this Article
might reach the same result but for a different reason—one more in
line with legislative intent. The interaction between federal and state
banking systems is so highly complex as to indicate that Congress
likely delegated it to the agency. As the Court acknowledged, the
OCC had to determine whether “duplicative state examination,
supervision, and regulation” that undoubtedly would burden
mortgage lending by national banks would similarly burden that

315. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006).
316. Id. § 24.
317. Ernest T. Patrikis & Glen R. Cuccinello, Supreme Court Extends Federal Preemption to
National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, 124 BANKING L.J. 512, 515 (2007).
318. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
319. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006).
320. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1) (2006); 31 Fed. Reg. 11,459, 11,459–60 (Aug. 31, 1966).
321. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572–73 (2007).
322. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
323. See id. at 1572.
324. See id.
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lending “when engaged in by an operating subsidiary.” The agency’s
determination on these matters should have controlled because
Congress so intended and because it reflected a reasonable
reconciliation of the competing concerns underlying the statute.
Congress also has reasons to delegate preemption questions
when necessary to obtain consensus. The 2007 fuel economy
legislation offers an illustration. That legislation set an average fuel
economy standard of thirty-five miles per gallon for new automobiles
326
by 2020.
During negotiations, Representative John Dingell
(D-Mich.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) waged a
heated battle over many issues, including whether to preempt
California and other states from setting their own more stringent
327
standards. Representative Dingell asked for specific language that
328
would have preempted state standards, and Speaker Pelosi resisted.
329
The legislators agreed to leave the issue ambiguous. The fight
330
recommenced promptly at the administrative level.
The point of these examples is not to show that the
nondelegation canons are unjustified. Rather, the point is to show
that the nondelegation canons must be justified on normative
grounds. The Court, for its part, has not maintained a steadfast
commitment to the nondelegation canons in the face of evidence that
331
Congress may have intended the delegation. Thus, the Court has
shown ambivalence about which values ought to prevail. A
delegation-respecting theory does not prevent more rigorous defense

325. Id. at 1570.
326. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(a)(2),
121 Stat. 1492, 1499.
327. See John M. Broder & Micheline Maynard, Deal in Congress on Plan to Raise Fuel
Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A1.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Greenhouse
Gas Rules for Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at A1 (noting that, on the heels of the new fuel
economy legislation, the EPA blocked California and other states from imposing their own
standards and that the states plan to file a federal lawsuit to reverse that decision).
331. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991) (refusing to invalidate an agency
interpretation—the so-called abortion “gag rule”—even though it raised a possible First
Amendment question); Mendelson, supra note 303, at 740 (noting inconsistency in the
preemption context); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (“Most
commentators who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern preemption
jurisprudence is a muddle.”); Sharkey, supra note 302, at 243 (stating that Congress has
provided “little or no direction” in the preemption debate).
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of nondelegation tools. But it underscores the necessity of that
defense.
3. The Administrative Law Alternative. My preference is not to
embrace the nondelegation canons or textualism to constrain broad
delegations, even though I am sympathetic to the problem that they
seek to address. I would address this problem another, better way.
Although this is not the place to fully elaborate my suggestion, the
basic idea is that courts should reframe nondelegation worries in
terms of administrative behavior rather than legislative behavior.
Broad delegations give agencies considerable latitude in answering
interpretive questions. And agencies can fall short of proper
performance. Specifically, agencies can fail to adequately consider all
the relevant factors or interests involved, particularly if a particular
result is important to the agency’s priorities or to the administration’s
332
priorities. Under these circumstances, a court could remand the
interpretation to the agency for further consideration under the
333
arbitrary and capricious test of administrative law.
The administrative law strategy would send agencies a strong
message about a court’s own view of the question involved but, at the
same time, would have certain modesty. First, it would not pit the
court against Congress when circumstances suggest that Congress is
334
likely to have intended the interpretive delegation. For a court to
impose its own views or call for a clear statement when Congress
intended the agency to balance the competing interests does not
promote good interbranch relations.
Second, an administrative law approach would not enable courts
to assume excessive interpretive control, as the traditional
nondelegation strategies can do. Given the complexities of the

332. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) (requiring the agency to consider the relevant factors and remanding a rule that failed to
do so).
333. See Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium, supra note 29, at 1415–31 (arguing
that courts might withhold deference from agency interpretations that fail to articulate limiting
standards); see also Stack, supra note 159, at 958 (arguing that the reasoned decisionmaking
requirement may serve nondelegation norms).
334. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 51, at 915 (arguing that the avoidance of questions
canon expands the Court’s authority beyond its constitutional limits and quoting Judge Posner,
who says that the canon is therefore likely to “sharpen the tensions between the legislative and
judicial branches” (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 285 (1985))); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 90–97
(advocating abandoning the avoidance of questions canon).
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legislative process, Congress rarely provides express agency
authorization in response to a clear statement rule or restrictive
335
judicial interpretation. Rather, Congress usually leaves in place the
court’s narrowing construction, whether or not that decision reflects
336
legislative preferences. Consequently, courts alone can determine
that a statute does not reach a particular subject, preempt state law,
raise a constitutional question, or impose a harsh criminal sanction.
Furthermore, courts can do so more often than they should because
statutory interpretation provides a relatively low-cost method of
protecting normative values. Compared to constitutional
decisionmaking, statutory interpretation often attracts less public
attention and represents less legal change. The Court can use
statutory interpretation to protect federalism values in a decision like
Gonzales without drawing the reaction that it would for overruling
the leading Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment decisions.
Lower courts can use statutory interpretation to protect normative
values without incurring the wrath of the Court for usurping the
337
power to alter constitutional law.
Finally and related, an administrative law approach would afford
agencies an opportunity to reweigh interpretive questions. Agencies
are still in the best position to resolve interpretive questions, even if
338
courts can help clarify the interests at stake. Agencies have a better
understanding of the regulatory scheme and its complexities.
Furthermore, agencies have a connection to both political branches.
Congress as well as the White House can participate in the
339
formulation of policy at the administrative level. By remanding an
issue to the agency, courts could signal Congress to take note. This
strategy may not force Congress to take responsibility for policy
340
choices when drafting legislation. But it could prompt Congress to

335. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study
of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604,
1605 (2007) (examining congressional responses to Supreme Court preemption decisions during
the 1993 through 2003 Terms and concluding that “Congress almost never responds to the
Court’s preemption decisions, so mistaken interpretations for or against preemption are
unlikely to be corrected”).
336. See id.
337. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 469–81 (2002) (describing the Court’s angry
response to the efforts of a D.C. Circuit judge to alter the nondelegation doctrine).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 268–69.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 270–71.
340. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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play a more active role in the selection of such choices by the agency,
which is an advantage from a democratic perspective.
Administrative law is not a perfect substitute for statutory
interpretation precisely because it does not allow courts to lock in a
particular interpretation on normative grounds. An agency has a
second shot, albeit one that occurs in the shadow of a judicial remand
and with the increased scrutiny of interested parties. To my mind,
that is a desirable result. The formulation of regulatory policy often
involves reconciling conflicting interests, suggesting that judges
should not simply elevate one value at the expense of other important
considerations. The best way to discipline broad delegations, in light
of all the factors at stake, is for courts to ensure that agencies
adequately consider those factors and defend their resulting policy
choices.
*

*

*

In sum, the objections to the theory I propose in this Article are
not without responses. If courts are to respect agency delegation, they
must be willing to reorient their approach. They would encounter
tradeoffs with other goals. This Article is not meant to discount those
other goals but to call for balance among them. The existing
interpretive framework does a poor job of enabling courts to respect
agency delegation. A theory that aims to improve on that front and
secure related values would carry institutional costs, perhaps not
much more so than the existing framework though certainly more so
than a default deference rule. It would also present starkly the degree
to which Congress likely delegates interpretive authority to agencies
despite judicial and scholarly preferences for nondelegation. Courts
and commentators must examine how best to vindicate nondelegation
values once they fully appreciate the distance between those values
and legislative realities.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that existing administrative law inadequately
positions courts to recognize the existence of agency delegation
because it invites courts to apply the traditional theories of statutory
interpretation. For all their differences, the traditional theories
operate in a similar fashion, directing courts to construe statutory text
as if Congress was aiming for a relatively specific meaning. This basic
presumption about legislative behavior cannot be squared with what
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many political scientists and legal scholars have been saying for some
time about how Congress designs regulatory statutes. And it is this
basic presumption that Chevron and Mead fail to sufficiently dislodge.
In this Article, I imagine a theory of statutory interpretation that
focuses courts on the factors that matter to Congress when delegating
interpretive authority to agencies. For example, Congress is likely to
delegate when an issue is complex, both to conserve legislative time
and harness agency expertise. It is likely to delegate when an issue is
contentious and an obstacle to a law’s enactment. Whatever the
reason for delegating, Congress is likely to seek means for ensuring
that agency interpretations roughly track legislative preferences.
Congress can use administrative procedures to place constituents in
the administrative process, where those constituents can demand
legislative intervention if agency interpretations stray too far. It can
also observe agency interpretations directly if an agency is involved in
the legislative drafting process or has a prior longstanding
interpretation. To create a better theory, courts would focus on these
factors rather than the relative clarity of language as a proxy for
interpretive delegation. Even one reason for delegating and one
condition on the delegation might suffice to build a case for
interpretive delegation. But the stronger the case, the less courts
should be inclined to read the statutory text as clear and as
foreclosing the delegation.
Although my theory departs from the framework that courts
generally apply, I have shown that it is not without precedent.
Members of the Court can be understood to have pursued a strikingly
similar approach. I offer these cases, not as examples of a burgeoning
trend in statutory interpretation, but, more modestly, to show how
the Court can incorporate more realistic assumptions of legislative
behavior into statutory interpretation if it chooses.
The theory that this Article envisions has many advantages.
Taking account of legislative realities is worthwhile in its own right
and to promote agency expertise and political accountability, as well
as rule-of-law values. Agencies should possess interpretive authority
as often as Congress delegates such authority—and no more often
than that—to ensure that regulatory policy is technically
sophisticated, publicly responsive, and consistently applied.
I have acknowledged that a delegation-respecting theory raises
an institutional objection. Lower courts might struggle to apply it, as
they have Mead. I have argued against condemning the new theory on
the basis of lower courts’ experience with Mead. It promises to
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simplify Mead while integrating more appropriate assumptions about
legislative behavior. Even if a delegation-respecting theory is
intolerably complicated, I have contended that Chevron still fails to
provide the proper rule. That decision has never been particularly
easy for courts to apply. Moreover, I have argued that it cannot
supply the relevant test for normative reasons. The only
institutionally simple and normatively justifiable proposal is a true
presumption of judicial deference, directing reviewing courts to
uphold agency interpretations more so than Chevron’s presumption
has ever done.
Finally, I have noted that a delegation-respecting theory presents
a challenge for the use of statutory interpretation to constrain broad
delegations. As a general matter, my theory does not preclude courts
from pursuing this strategy. Yet it does suggest that courts can no
longer base their interpretive practices on how Congress designs
statutes. Furthermore, there is a better way to address the underlying
concerns about broad delegations. Courts could use administrative
law to police how agencies exercise their interpretive authority rather
than using statutory interpretation to narrow delegations that
Congress likely intended to make. I believe that this approach would
offer courts a better role to play. Courts could make known their
views on issues that implicate normative values, but agencies would
reconcile the competing interests through application of their
specialized expertise and in consultation with the political branches.
When courts think about the proper method for interpreting
regulatory statutes, they recognize the need to account for the
possibility of agency delegation. But existing law confines them to
interpretive practices ill suited to this context. As a result, courts
construct a meaning for text in regulatory statutes more often than
they should. A more deferential approach, with more restrained
opportunities for judicial intervention, would produce better
regulatory policy. It would allow agencies the leeway to set regulatory
policy under judicial supervision rather than subject to judicial
domination.

